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ARTICLE 
CODE OF SILENCE: POLICE 
SHOOTINGS AND THE RIGHT TO 
REMAIN SILENT 
ROBERT M. MYERS· 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Scene: A gritty urban alley. A man lies dead 
from gunshot wounds. Standing a few feet away 
is the shooter. 
Enter: Two Homicide detectives emerge from 
an unmarked police car. 
Detective 1 [to shooter]: You're the one that fired 
the shots? 
Shooter: Yeah. 
Detective 1: What happened? 
Shooter: I want to talk to my lawyer. 
Detective 2: So you won't talk to us? 
Shooter: No. I claim my Fifth Amendment privi-
lege. 
Detective 1: Then get out of here. 
The notion of police detectives allowing a killer to walk 
away without providing an explanation is so foreign to the 
public consciousness that this scene smacks of a Twilight Zone 
episode. Yet, when the shooter is another police officer, scenar-
• Civil rights lawyer, Los Angeles, California. From 1981-1992, the author 
served as City Attorney of the City of Santa Monica and was involved in inves-
tigating officer-involved shootings. I am grateful to Ronald K.L. Collins and Karl 
Manheim for their thoughtful advice and comments and to Joseph W. Doherty for 
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ios like this are acted out on the streets of American cities. Too 
often, this is the real-life world of officer-involved shootings. 
Two events in September 1995 gave the public a brief 
glimpse of law enforcement officers asserting the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege. In the "trial of the century," Los Angeles Police 
Department Detective Mark Fuhrman asserted the privilege 
during the O.J. Simpson murder trial in response to questions 
concerning whether he planted evidence or provided truthful 
testimony.l A week later, an FBI agent asserted the privilege 
in response to a Senate committee's inquiry concerning the 
shootout at Ruby Ridge, Idaho.2 These highly publicized exer-
cises of the privilege are rare. For the most part, invocations of 
the privilege by the police are a regular occurrence outside the 
scope of public scrutiny. 
At this real-world crossing, two basic tenets of constitu-
tional democracy intersect - control of government and preser-
vation of liberty. On the one hand, the people need to regulate 
the state, especially when it is empowered to take human life. 
On the other hand, civil liberties must be safeguarded, even 
when those who claim them stand in the shoes of the state. At 
this juncture, however, we seem to return to the Twilight Zone. 
For, it may be asked, how can we both control the state and, at 
the same time, grant its agents constitutional protection? 
Before we get to this question, it is necessary to first un-
derstand just how much and what kind of official latitude we 
allow the state when it comes to the sanctioned use of deadly 
force by police officials. Having done that, we can then consider 
the character and scope of certain constitutional claims some-
times invoked by police officers in this context. This latter 
consideration - the central focus of this article - points to a 
peculiar phenomenon, namely, the specter of government act-
ing as a powerful deputy authorized to use lethal force and as 
a powerless individual in need of constitutional safeguards. 
Typically, we do not think of the government wearing both 
1. See Stephanie Simon et al., Fuhrman Invokes 5th Amendment, Refuses to 
Testify, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 7, 1995, at AI. 
2. See Ronald J. Ostrow, FBI Agent Declines to Testify About Siege, L.A. 
TIMEs, Sept. 13, 1995, at A12. 
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hats. Yet, when it does, the result is often perplexing. Having 
thus introduced this perplexity, it is now appropriate to return 
to a preliminary but nevertheless significant matter - official 
use of deadly force in America. 
A. DEADLY FORCE: ITS USE AND CONTROL 
In the United States "police are more heavily armed and 
shoot more often than police in any other Western democra-
cy."a According to the FBI Law Enforcement Bulletin, "[t]he 
most tangible expression of governmental authority is the 
power to deprive an individual of 'life, liberty, or property."'· 
When police exercise this' awesome power through firing a gun, 
"the immediate consequences of their decisions are realized at 
the rate of 1,500 feet per second and are beyond reversal by 
any level of official review.,,5 
Controlling the use of deadly force by law enforcement has 
been the focus of police administrators, academ:icians, civil 
rights lawyers and community groupS.6 Because law enforce-
ment holds a "virtual monopoly on the legitimate use of 
force,"7 managing its exercise represents a key issue "concern-
ing social control in contemporary society."8 Therefore, police 
3. James Lindgren, Organization and Other Constraints on Controlling the 
Use of Deadly Force by Police, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI .. , May 1981, at 
110, 111. 
4. John C. Hall, Constitutional Constraints on the Use of Force, FBI Law 
Enforcement Bull., Feb. 1992, at 22. 
5. Ed McErlain, Deadly Force: An Age·Old Problem, A Future Solution, CAL. 
PEACE OFFICER, Mar. 1992, at 24. 
6. Indeed, because the right to use deadly force is sanctioned, "[a]ccountablity 
of law enforcement officers is of special importance .... " Robert Berkley Harper, 
Accountability of Law Enforcement in the Use of Deadly Force, 26 How. L. J. 119 
(1983). One law enforcement group noted, "[m]anaging the use of force by officers 
is one of the most difficult challenges facing law enforcement agencies today." 
International Association of Chiefs of Police National Law Enforcement Policy 
Center, Use of Force 1 (1989). 
7. William B. Waegel, The Use of Lethal Force by Police: The Effect of Statu· 
tory Change, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 121, 135 (1984). The availability of deadly force 
is the central characteristic that distinguishes police from other civilian agencies. 
G. Larry Mays & William A. Taggart, Deadly Force as a Police Problem in Local 
Law Enforcement: Do Administrative Practices Make a Difference?, 5 POL'y STUD. 
REV. 309 (1985). 
8. William B. Waegel, The Use of Lethal Force by Police: The Effect of Statu· 
tory Change, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 121, 135 (1984). 
3
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shooting policies squarely raise the complex moral question of 
when it is appropriate to take human life.9 
No hard-and-fast rules have been crafted to constrain the 
use of deadly force by police officers.10 Instead, an elastic con-
9. See Arnold Binder & Peter Scharf, Deadly Force in Law Enforcement, 28 
CRIME & DELINQ. 1, 5 (1982). The regulatory value placed on human life varies 
among police agencies. For example, the City of New York Police Department has 
adopted the following policy on use of deadly force: 
The New York City Police Department recognizes 
the value of all human life and is committed to respecting 
the dignity of every individual. The primary duty of all 
members of the service is to preserve human life. 
The most serious act in which a police officer can 
engage is the use of deadly force. The power to carry and 
use firearms in the course of public service is an awe-
some responsibility. Respect for human life requires that, 
in all cases, firearms be used as a last resort, and then 
only to protect life. Only the minimal amount of force 
necessary to protect human life should be used by uni-
formed members of the service. Where feasible, and con-
sistent with personal safety, some warning, such as "PO-
LICE - DON'T MOVE," should be given. Deadly force is 
never justified in the defense of property. Above all, the 
safety of the public and uniformed members of the service 
must be the overriding concern whenever the use of fire-
arms is considered. 
New York City Police Department, Patrol Guide, Procedure No. 104-01, July 8, 
1993, at 9 (emphasis in original). 
By sharp contrast the Seattle Police Department policy provides: 
Use of Force - Generally: The public has vested in police 
officers the lawful authority to use force to protect them-
selves and others and perform their official duties when 
no reasonably effective alternative to the use of force ap-
pears to exist and the amount of force used is reasonable 
to effect the lawful purpose intended. 
The Department's use of force policy implements state 
law. To the extent that Department policy may contain 
additional provisions not addressed in state law, such 
provisions are not intended, nor may they be construed or 
applied, to create a higher standard of care or a duty 
toward any person or to provide a basis for criminal or 
civil liability against the City, its officials or individual 
police officers. However, violation of such additional provi-
sions may form the basis for Department disciplinary or 
other action. 
Seattle Police Department, Policy and Procedure Manual 197. 
10. Bright line rules can be developed in some areas of police shootings such 
as when to shoot at fleeing suspects. However, so long as deadly force is a law 
enforcement option, the individual judgment of police officers will continue to come 
into play because "[n]o regulation or directives, however carefully thought out, are 
4
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cept of reasonableness guides the trigger finger. l1 The most 
significant judicial limitation of deadly force occurred with the 
Supreme Court's 1985 decision holding that deadly force can-
not be used to prevent the escape of an unarmed fleeing fel-
on.12 Concluding that "[i]t is not better that all felony suspects 
die than that they escape,"13 Justice White's majority ruling 
noted that it was constitutionally unreasonable to shoot a 
fleeing suspect "[ w]here the suspect poses no immediate threat 
to the officer and no threat to others, the harm resulting from 
failing to apprehend him does not justify the use of deadly 
force to do SO.,,14 Although this decision produced a pointed 
dissene5 and was criticized by some,16 its impact on the 
completely adequate in potentially dangerous situations where critical infonnation 
is often incomplete or lacking." R. James Holzworth & Catherine B. Pipping, 
Drawing a Weapon: An Analysis of Police Judgments, 13 J. POLICE SCI. & ADMIN. 
185 (1985). Hence, it is essential that police officers be appropriately trained in 
the use of deadly force. John C. Hall, Firearms Training and Liability, FBI Law 
Enforcement Bull., Jan. 1993, at 27. 
11. In Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (1989), the United States Supreme 
Court established that "all claims that law enforcement officers have used exces-
sive force-deadly or not-in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other 
'seizure' of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment and its 
'reasonableness' standard." Id. at 395. The Graham Court stated that the reason-
ableness of any use of force involves a balancing of the rights of the individual 
against interests of the government, requiring "careful attention to the facts and 
circumstances of each particular case, including the severity of the crime at issue, 
whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers or 
others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest 
by flight." Id. at 396. Importantly the Court noted that "reasonableness" of force 
"must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene, rather 
than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight." [d. at 396. 
12. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). Garner rejected the old Eng-
lish common law rule under which deadly force could be used to apprehend fleeing 
felons. At the time of the decision, Tennessee and 22 other states followed this 
rule. Id. at 16-17. 
13. [d. at 11. 
14. Id. 
15. See id. at 22-23 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). 
16. See James J. Kilpatrick, A Time to Shoot, WASHINGTON POST, Apr. 8, 1985, 
at All. Some have suggested that there must be significant costs to deter individ-
uals from fleeing the police. "Murderers, anned robbers, and other violent crimi-
nals facing long prison sentences must face the deterrent of deadly force in decid-
ing on whether to flee." Ian C. Weiner, Running Rampant: The Imposition of 
Sanctions and the Use of Force Against Fleeing Criminal Suspects, 80 GEO. L. J. 
2175, 2194 (1992). 
Many law enforcement agencies joined as amici curiae in support of 
Cleamtee Garner, the father of the minor killed by the Memphis Police Depart-
ment. See Police Groups Ask Supreme Court to Modify Fleeing Felon Law, Crimi-
nal Justice Newsletter, Sept. 4, 1984, at 4. Their brief observed "that laws permit-
5
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number of police shootings is questionable. 17 In fact, a sig-
nificant drop in police shootings had already occurred during 
the 1970s as a result of administrative rulemaking by many 
police departments to manage the exercise of deadly force. IS 
In this deca~e, American police officers have killed over 
350 persons annually19 and wounded numerous others.20 
Many shootings were controversial21 and some were inevitably 
ting police officers to use deadly force to apprehend unarmed, non· violent fleeing 
felony suspects actually do not protect citizens or law enforcement officers, do not 
deter crime or alleviate problems caused by crime, and do not improve the crime· 
fighting ability of law enforcement agencies." Brief for Police Foundation et aI. as 
Amici Curiae at 11, Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985). 
17. It did, however, result in greater liability exposure for police agencies. For 
example, the City of Santa Monica "agreed to pay almost $1.1 million to the fami· 
ly of a recreation leader shot to death by a police officer while running from the 
scene of a robbery." Marilyn Martinez, SM to Pay $1.3 Million to Man's Kin, THE 
OUTWOK, Aug. 19, 1993, at AI. 
18. See Paul G. Chevigny, Police Deadly Force as Social Control: Jamaica, 
Argentina, and Brazil, 1 CRIM. L.F. 389, 391 (1990). See also Anthony V. Bouza, 
Myths and Hard Truths About Police Shootings, 13 U. TOL. L. REV. 337, 345 
(1981). 
19. U.S. Department of Justice, Crime in the United States 1994: Uniform 
Crime Reports 22 (1995). For the period 1990·1994, the following justifiable homi· 






[d. See WILLIAM A. GELLER & MICHAEL SCO'I'l', DEADLY FORCE: WHAT WE KNow 
503 (1992). Comparing police fatalities across time may not paint an accurate 
picture of trends because a variety of factors account for fatality rates and these 
factors may change over time. Factors include "officer marksmanship, type of am-
munition, location and number of wounds, and the availability of prompt, high 
quality emergency medical care." [d. at 99. 
20. There are no national figures on the number of shooting incidents by po-
lice officers or the number of persons who received non-fatal wounds. However, 
"[t]he numbers of wounded and slain criminal suspects in the United States pale 
by comparison to the numbers shot at but missed by police." WILLIAM A. GELLER 
& MICHAEL SCO'I'l', DEADLY FORCE: WHAT WE KNow 100 (1992). The following 
chart provides information from major police departments for the period from 
1980-91: 
Shot Shot Missed 
Fatally Non-fatally 
New York 309 771 2513 
Los Angeles 267 435 638 
Houston 117 259 502 
Atlanta 54 107 390 
[d. at 516, 519, 523·24. 
21. See, e.g., Tony Perry, Police Killing Outrages Poor Side of Town, L.A. 
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unlawful.22 Studies have demonstrated that the rate of police 
shootings vary greatly from city to city.23 In 1992, for exam-
TIMES, Apr. 20, 1993, at A3; Report Says Suspect Killed by Police Was Shot in 
Back, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 23, 1993 (National), at A3; Daryl Kelley, Ventura DA 
Says Fatal Raid Was Unjustified, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 30, 1993, at AI; Jury Absolves 
New Jersey Officer in Killing that Ignited Protests, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 7, 1993, § 1 
(National), at 19; Patrick J. McDonnell, Officer's Acquittal in Border Slaying 
Sparks Protests, L.A. TIMEs, Dec. 18, 1992, at A3; Was This Shooting Necessary?, 
L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13, 1992, at B6; Evelyn Nieves, Newark Police Shootings Revive 
Calls for Oversight, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 11, 1992 (National), at A14; Robert F. 
Howe, NAACP is Probing VA Shooting, WASHINGTON POST, Aug. 28, 1992, at D3; 
Roberto Suro, Quiet City in Texas Hears Anger of Blacks Over Woman's Death, 
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 1992 (National), at A8; Charles Strum, An Officer Admits 
Lies in Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 7, 1992 (National), at A12; Andrea Ford & 
Richard A. Serrano, Questions Raised About Fatal Shooting by Police, L.A. TIMES, 
July 3, 1992, at AI; Steven Lee Myers, A Fatal Shooting By Police Ignites Protest 
in Bushwick, N.Y. TIMES, May 25, 1992 (Local), at A23; Police Shooting Ignites 
Disturbance in Mobile, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1992 (National), at All; Robert Hanley, 
Students March to Protest Handling of Teaneck Shooting, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 1992 
(Local), at 29; George Ramos & Rich Connell, 100 Protestors Gather at Scene After 
Watts Man is Slain by Police, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 30, 1991, at A28; George James, 
Protest Against Police in Flatbush Shooting Death, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 1991 
(Local), at B3; Dean E. Murhpy, Melee Erupts in East L.A After Deputy Kills 
Man, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 4, 1991, at AI. It should be noted that "[flor most main-
stream papers, police reporting means relying mainly on police sources-a practice 
that contributes to the undercoverage of police brutality." Kim Deterline, Alterna-
tive Media: Going Beyond Police Sources to Uncover Police Abuse, EXTRA!, July-
Aug. 1993, at 23. 
22. Consider the following audiotape of a fatal shooting by a Los Angeles 
County Sheriff deputy that raises significant questions about the decision to use 
deadly force: 
Officer One: He's got my foot! He's got my foot! 
Shoot him! Shoot him! Get off him! Get off, I'm going to 
shoot him! [unintelligible] Shoot him! He's got my foot! 
Officer Two: No! No! No! No! Wait, wait, wait wait. 
Wait. Wait. 
[gunshots] 
Officer Two: Damn it! 
[more gunshots] 
Special Counsel James G. Kolts & Staff, The Los Angeles County Sherift's Depart-
ment 137 (1992). 
23. See James Lindgren, Organization and Other Constraints on Controlling the 
Use of Deadly Force by Police, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., May 1981, at 
110; Lawrence W. Sherman & Robert H. Langworthy, Measuring Homicide by 
Police Officers, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 546 (1979). A comprehensive study 
of shooting policies in the County of Los Angeles revealed that "[a]s long as police 
policy is in large part simply a reflection of the personal philosophy of the police 
chief who administers an individual police department, it is inescapable that fIfty 
police departments administered by fifty different chiefs will have substantial dif-
ferences in policy." Gerald F. Uelman, Varieties of Police Policy: A Study of Police 
Policy Regarding the Use of Deadly Force in Los Angeles County, 6 LoY. L.A. L. 
REV. 1, 59 (1973). 
7
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pIe, Los Angeles police shot ten people per every 1,000 officers 
whereas New York police shot three people per every 1,000 
officers.24 Another study found that the frequency of police 
shootings varied from 0.5 to 2.5 persons killed per every 
100,000 people.25 Variations in shooting rates may well be the 
result of differing organizational policies concerning the use of 
force. 26 
Although police shootings sometimes produce demands for 
public accountability, police officers understandably tend to be 
skeptical of outside scrutiny. As one police chief candidly ob-
served: 
The police know they are involved in a violent 
business, and seek protection that flexible lan-
guage will allow. Tragic, but honest, mistakes do 
occur in the split-second environment of the 
streets, and the police want their flanks pro-
tected, especially from the demands of insistent 
groups. Police have learned that survivalist 
politicians will be tempted to throw them to the 
wolves.27 
Police officers may not always believe that the public can fully 
appreciate the dangers of police work.28 Life and death deci-
sions have to be made on the spot and the view among many 
officers is that they would rather be "judged by twelve rather 
than carried out by Six."29 For some officers, a shooting is the 
24. See John L. Mitchell, Officer-Involved Shootings at lO-Year High, LA 
TIMES, Jan. 28, 1993, at BI. 
25. See Lawrence W. Shennan & Robert H. Langworthy, Measuring Homicide 
by Police Officers, 70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 546, 556 (1979). A more recent 
study of 35 cities found that the discharge rate per 100 officers varied from .34 to 
7.15 shots. Lorie Fridell, Justifiable Use of Measures in Research on Deadly Force, 
17 J. CRIM. JUST. 157, 160 (1989). 
26. See James Lindgren, Organization and Other Constraints on Controlling the 
Use of Deadly Force by Police, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCL, May 1981, at 
110, 112. 
27. Anthony V. Bouza, Myths and Hard Truths About Police Shootings, 13 U. 
TOL. L. REV. 337, 338 (1981) (author was the chief of police of Minneapolis, Min-
nesota Police Department). 
28. One commentator noted: "Police officers patrol the streets of America's 
cities today with more fear, despair, doubt and loneliness than ever before." Lee P. 
Brown, A Finger in the Dike as Cities Decay, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 8, 1993, at B7. 
29. William B. Waegel, How Police Justify the Use of Deadly Force, 32 SOCIAL 
PROBLEMS 144, 147 (Dec. 1984). 
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"ultimate clash of good against evil.,,30 The perception that the 
public supports tough measures against criminals31 can rein-
force some officers' perception that a shooting means instant 
justice.32 When department management does not articulate 
and enforce clear restrictions on shootings, "subcultural values 
defining certain uses of violence as serving positive ends ap-
pear to take precedence over legal responsibilities in guiding 
the behavior of some officers."33 
Police fears of public accountability may well prove un-
founded since public scrutiny of police shootings typically tends 
to be deferentia1.34 Internal review is designed in part to but-
tress public confidence and trust in a police department.35 
Ironically, the specter of civil liability can cause some depart-
ments to temper thorough investigation and documentation of 
internal reviews.36 Moreover, it is widely recognized that pros-
ecutors are reluctant to bring charges against police officers. 
30. See id. at 150. 
31. One expert concluded that "a good part of the public wants the police to 
be brutal." Police Brutality, 1 CQ RESEARCHER 635, 639 (1991) (quoting Professor 
James Fyfe). 
32. See William B. Waegel, How Police Justify the Use of Deadly Force, 32 
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 144, 149-50 (Dec. 1984). 
33. William B. Waegel, The Use of Lethal Force by Police: The Effect of Statu-
tory Change, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 121, 137 (1984). 
34. See William B. Waegel, How Police Justify the Use of Deadly Force, 32 
SOCIAL PROBLEMS 144, 146 (Dec. 1984). 
35. See James Lindgren, Organization and Other Constraints on Controlling the 
Use of Deadly Force by Police, ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI., May 1981, at 
110, 115. 
36. The legal consequences of police shootings preclude documenting improper 
police conduct. For example, an article appearing in a law enforcement journal 
warned of the legal liability arising from information obtained in internal investi-
gations: 
Departmental chiefs and superior officers should be sensi-
tive to material contained in reports of internal investiga-
tions of excessive force complaints and be aware that the 
findings and conclusions arising from such investigations 
will probably find their way into any subsequent civil liti-
gation against the officers and the municipal entity. Fur-
ther, statements and documents given to outside investi-
gatory agencies are just as likely to be offered against 
S.1983 defendants. A cautious, common-sense approach to 
post-excessive force investigations, internal or external, 
would appear to be the best course. 
Milton Thurm, The Post-Excessive Force Investigation: Its Effect on Your Agency's 
Civil Liability, THE POLICE CHIEF, Feb. 1992, at 8, 9. 
9
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Prosecutors depend upon the cooperation of police officers, 
often share the same law enforcement values and "generally 
are elected politicians sensitive to the law-and-order senti-
ments of their constituency."37 
Notwithstanding deferential review, police officers are 
occasionally disciplined38 or prosecuted39 following their use 
of deadly force. Predictably, police officers have sought to pro-
tect themselves from such consequences. As discussed in the 
37. William B. Waegel, The Use of Lethal Force by Police: The Effect of Statu· 
tory Change, 30 CRIME & DELINQ. 121, 135 (1984) (citation omitted). "The police 
then are in fact an arm of the prosecutor's officer; all are an intimate part of the 
law enforcement apparatus of the state. In such a setting, it is almost impossible 
for the prosecutor to be free and unbiased." Arthur L. Kobler, Police Homicide in 
Democracy, 31 J. SOC. ISSUES 163, 174 (1975). 
38. See Victor Merina & Richard A. Serrano, 2 Deputies Fired for Killing of 
Disturbed Man, L.A. TIMEs, Jan. 22, 1992, at A1. The Kolts Commission found: 
The LASD rarely sustains civilian complaints of excessive 
force. Of those complaints it does sustain, many result in 
discipline which appears to far too lenient. . . . [M]ost cit-
izen complaints of excessive force sustained in the last 
three years result in suspensions of 5 days or less. Given 
that the standard punishment for denting a patrol car 
bumper is a 2-day suspension, it is clear that the LASD 
does not adequately punish its officers who use excessive 
force. 
Special Counsel James G. Kolts & Staff, The Los Angeles County Sherift's Depart-
ment 119 (1992). A similar conclusion was reached by the Christopher Commis-
sion. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, RE-
PORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT 
xix (1991) ("[o]f the 2,152 citizen allegations of excessive force from 1986 through 
1990, only 42 were sustained"). 
39. See William Booth, Law Officer is Acquitted in Florida, WASHINGTON POST, 
May 29, 1993, at AI; Charles Strum, Grand Jury Indicts 3 Newark Officers, N.Y. 
Times, Sept. 30, 1992 (National), at AI; Kevin Sullivan & Veronica T. Jennings, 
MD. Officer Gets 1 Year in Fatal Shooting, WASHINGTON POST, July 18, 1992, at 
AI; James Barron, 2 Officers Are Indicted in Shootings of Civilians, N.Y. Times, 
July 3, 1992 (Local), at B3; New York Police Union Blasts DA Over Indictment of 
Officer, Crim. Just. Newsl., Feb. 15, 1985, at 1. However, these prosecutions are 
the exception. For example, from 1980 through early 1991, the Los Angeles Dis-
trict Attorney "investigated 678 shootings by LAPD officers . . . and prosecuted 
officers in none of them." Ted Rohrlich, Officer Shooting Probes Held Flawed, L.A. 
TIMES, July 11, 1991, at A23. However, in June, 1993, "a white Los Angeles police 
officer who shot a black tow truck driver has become the county's first law en-
forcement officer in more than a decade to be charged with murder for a killing 
while on duty." Martin Berg, DA Charges Police Officer with Murder, L.A. DAILY 
Jo., June 29, 1993, at 1. These charges were dropped in 1995 after two trial re-
sulted in hung juries. John L. Mitchell, Third Trial Ruled Out in Slaying by Offi-
cer, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 4, 1995, at B1. 
10
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss3/3
1996] FIFTH AMENDMENT 507 
next part of this Article, police officers have found this protec-
tion in the Fifth Amendment privilege. 
B. DEADLY FORCE RECONSTITUTED: POLICE AND THE PRIVILEGE 
Some police officers have invoked the Fifth Amendment40 
privilege against self-incrimination to minimize their exposure 
to criminal prosecution following on-duty shootings.41 As the 
head of its officer-involved shooting unit noted, Los Angeles 
Police Department officers will not give voluntary statements 
following on-duty shootings.42 Such attitudes, however prob-
lematic, are increasingly becoming part of police culture, a 
culture grounded in governmental power and constitutional 
privilege. 
These practices place in bold relief the point alluded to in 
the Introduction - the specter of government acting as a pow-
erful deputy authorized to use lethal force and as a powerless 
individual in need of constitutional safeguards. For who could 
have imagined that the same right once courageously invoked 
40. The Fifth Amendment provides that "[n]o person shall be . . . compelled in 
any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, 
or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend V. The "constitutions 
of all but two states include language relating specifically to self-incrimination." 8 
JOHN HENRY WIGMORE, EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAw § 2252 (John T. 
McNaughton ed. 1961). 
The privilege against self-incrimination "protects a person . . . against being 
incriminated by his own compelled, testimonial communications." Fisher v. United 
States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976). The privilege is not limited to criminal proceed-
ings, but also privileges a person "not to answer official questions put to him in 
any other proceeding, civil or criminal, formal or informal, where the answers 
might incriminate him in future criminal proceedings." Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 
U.S. 420, 426 (1984). See generally LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH 
AMENDMENT (1968). 
41. See, e.g., Dawn Weber, Probes of Police Shootings Get Scrutiny, L.A. DAlLY 
NEWS, Apr. 12, 1993, at 4. 
42. Lt. William Hall is reported to have said: "'[The District Attorney] would 
like a statement from the officers that isn't compelled,' Hall said. 'But I don't be-
lieve the officers would give a statement unless compelled.'" Dawn Weber, Probes 
of Police Shootings Get Scrutiny, L.A. DAlLY NEWS, Apr. 12, 1993, at 4. According 
to Lt. Hall, "[t]aking compelled statements is necessary ... in order for the de-
partment to get a truthful account from its officers." Sheryl Stolberg, Investigator 
of Officers Faces the Glare of Scrutiny, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 7, 1992, at AI. However, 
he also conceded: "'We kind of protect the officers' rights during investigation,' 
Hall said. 'It's important that when we talk to the officers they know that we're 
not there trying to put them in jail.'" Id. 
11
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against the state by John Lilburne (the 17th-century hero of 
the Great Privilege43) would later be cowardly invoked by the 
state. It is as if the king, having granted the right to his sub-
jects, thereafter realized the need to claim it for himself. How-
ever incredible, police now claim the privilege in modern Amer-
ica. The Warren Court's revolution in criminal justice found its 
way into the station house not only to protect criminal sus-
pects but also their interrogators. 
This exercise of the Fifth Amendment privilege is ironic 
given police skepticism about the strong safeguards protecting 
the constitutional rights of suspected criminals.44 Indeed, sev-
eral of the scenarios outlined above have prompted police agen-
cies to accord themselves safeguards that they would probably 
deny to criminal suspects. For example, California's Public 
Safety Officers' Procedural Bill of Rights46 requires that police 
officers be given Miranda-type warnings in certain non-custo-
dial settings. 46 
This Article explores the clash between the public'S need 
for accountability in police shootings and a police officer's con-
stitutional right to remain silent.47 Part II charts the legal 
43. See LEONARD w. LEVY, CONSTITUTIONAL OPINIONS: AsPECTS OF THE BILL 
OF RIGHTS, 14-39 (1986). 
44. See, e.g., Lawrence Baum, Police Response to Appellate Court Decisions: 
Mapp and Miranda, 7 POL'Y STUD. J. 425, 427 (1978) ("[m]ost police officers ap-
parently perceive that full compliance with the Supreme Court's restrictions on 
search and interrogation practices would impose substantial costs on them"); Peter 
W. Lewis & Harry E. Allen, "Participating Miranda": An Attempt to Subvert Cer-
tain Constitutional Safeguards, CRIME & DELINQ., Jan. 1977, at 75, 77 ("it is not 
uncommon for many law enforcement authorities to complain that Miranda serves 
only to 'handcuff effective law enforcement activities and ultimately allows 'dan-
gerous criminals to be set free on the streets"'). To some extent, this police criti-
cism is based upon a lack of understanding of the legal rules. As one commentator 
noted, "[t]he policeman is supposed to protect your life, rights, and property in 
that order; in fact, he protects life and property, and doesn't know your rights." 
Stephen L. Wasby, Police Training About Criminal Procedure: Infrequent and Inad-
equate, 7 POL'y STUD. J. 461 (1978) (quoting unidentified police training officer). 
45. CAL. GoV'T. CODE § 3300 et seq. (West 1980). 
46. CAL. GoV'T. CODE § 3303(g) (West 1980). See Lybarger v. City of Los An-
geles, 40 Cal. 3d 822, 828, 710 P.2d 329, 221 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1985) ("[p]rior to the 
act ... no such advice or admonition was required by law"). 
47. This Article will examine this issue under the federal Constitution. Be-
cause state constitutions often provide more significant protections, it does not 
necessarily follow that the conclusions of this Article would apply in every state. 
See Jennifer Frisen, State Constitutional Law: Litigation Individual Rights, Claims 
12
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precedents allowing police officers to invoke Fifth Amendment 
rights following on-duty shootings. Part III assesses the prob-
lems flowing from this invocation. Finally, Part IV explores the 
issue of whether police officers can be required to provide an 
account of their on-duty shootings useable in a criminal pro-
ceeding. 
II. CONSTITUTIONAL ORIGINS OF POLICE OFFICER'S 
RIGHT TO REMAIN SILENT 
For much of this nation's history, the constitutional rights 
of public employees were suspended when they clocked-in for 
work.48 Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes made the point well in 
his often-quoted adage that a policeman "may have a constitu-
tional right to talk politics, but he has no constitutional right 
to be a policeman.,,49 Thus, when an employee was suspected 
of criminal activity, many jurisdictions required the employee 
to surrender the privilege against self-incrimination as a condi-
tion of continued employment. 50 The choice faced by officers 
& Defenses (1992); Ronald K. L. Collins, Peter J. Galie & John Kincaid, State 
High Courts, State Constitutions, and Individual Rights Litigation Since 1980: A 
Judicial Survey, 13 HAsTINGS CONST. L.Q. 599 (1986). 
48. "For almost the first century of our national existence, federal employment 
was regarded as item of patronage, which could be granted, withheld, or with-
drawn for whatever reasons might appeal to the responsible executive hiring offi-
cer." Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134, 148 (1974). See Crenshaw v. United States, 
134 U.S. 99 (1890) (Navy officer could be removed from office at will); Parsons v. 
United States, 167 U.S. 324 (1897) (President can discharge district attorney at 
his pleasure); Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290 (1900) (post office clerks may 
be removed at pleasure). In 1947, the United States Supreme Court upheld the 
discharge of a federal employee for engaging in political activity in violation of the 
Hatch Act. United Public Workers v. Mitchell, 330 U.S. 75 (1947). Although the 
legal rights of public employees expanded during the 1950s and 1960s (Slochower 
v. Board of Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 
564 (1972», the rights of public employees have been more recently scaled-back in 
a variety of contexts. National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 
656 (1989) (drug testing of public employees permitted without reasonable suspi-
cion); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (reasonableness standards used for 
searches of public employees work areas); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) 
(questionnaire distributed to co-workers in prosecutor's office determined not a 
matter of public concern protected by the First Amendment). 
49. McAuliffe v. New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). The United 
States Supreme Court, over a half century later, reached a similar conclusion. See 
Adler v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952). 
50. See Note, Mandatory Dismissal of Public Personnel and the Privilege 
Against Self-Incrimination, 101 U. PA. L. REV. 1190 (1953). The purpose of these 
13
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confronted with interrogation was succinctly framed by one 
court: 
Duty required them to answer. Privilege pennit-
ted them to refuse to answer. They chose to 
exercise the privilege, but the exercise of such 
privilege was wholly inconsistent with their duty 
as police officers. They claim that they had a 
constitutional right to refuse to answer under 
the circumstances, but it is certain that they 
had no constitutional right to remain police 
officers in the face of their clear violation of the 
duty imposed upon them.51 
Speak or be fired requirements came under increasing 
scrutiny following the United States Supreme Court's 1964 
decision that the privilege against self-incrimination was appli-
cable to the states.52 Later, in Garrity v. New Jersey,53 the 
statutes was straight-forward: 
The avowed purpose of the statutes is to remove from 
office those who would obstruct investigation into the 
affairs of government by claiming their right against self-
incrimination. The statutes make no distinctions as to the 
type of office holder, the nature of the questions asked, or 
the duties performed by the person under question. 
[d. at 1191 (footnotes omitted). It appears that many of these statutes were enact-
ed as tools in the legislative investigation of subversive activity. [d. at 1190. In 
fact, many of the cases delineating the constitutional rights of public employees 
arose in the context of the ill-fated efforts of the post-World War II period to 
stamp out activities deemed subversive. See, e.g., Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 
385 U.S. 589 (1967) (public employment may not be conditioned on surrender of 
associational rights); Slochower v. Board of Higher Education, 350 U.S. 551 (1956); 
Alder v. Board of Education, 342 U.S. 485 (1952) (upholding law authorizing mem-
bership in certain organizations as prima facie evidence of unfitness for teaching 
position); Garner v. Board of Public Works, 341 U.S. 716 (1951) (dismissal of pub-
lic employee for refusal to disclose Communist Party affiliation upheld). 
51. Christal v. Police Commission, 33 Cal. App. 2d 564, 567-68, 92 P.2d 416, 
419 (1939). The court based its conclusion upon the role police officers play in 
society: 
When police officers acquire knowledge of the facts which 
will tend to incriminate any person, it is their duty to 
disclose such facts to their superiors. . . . It is for the 
performance of these duties that police officers are com-
missioned and paid by the community, and it is a viola-
tion of said duties for any police officer to refuse to dis-
close pertinent facts within his knowledge even though 
such disclosure may show, or tend to show, that he him-
self has engaged in criminal activities. 
[d. at 568, 92 P.2d at 419. 
52. See Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964). 
14
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Supreme Court held that Fifth Amendment values were com-
promised by efforts to force police officers to choose between 
their jobs and self-incrimination.54 In an investigation by the 
state attorney general, officers suspected of ticket-flxint5 
were informed that state law mandated their termination if 
they invoked the Fifth Amendment privilege. 56 Each officer 
elected to answer questions and some of their answers were 
later used against them in obtaining convictions for conspiracy 
to obstruct the administration of traffic laws.57 Noting that 
police officers "are not relegated to a watered-down version of 
constitutional rights,»58 the Court held that their compelled 
testimony violated the Fifth Amendment. The dilemma of 
choosing between one's job and self-incrimination was "the 
antithesis of free choice to speak out or to remain silent. »59 
The Justices thus concluded that the privilege provides a 
shield against the use of "statements obtained under threat of 
removal from office, and that it extends to all, whether they 
are policemen or other members of our body politic.,)6O 
A year later, in Gardner v. Broderick,61 the Court consid-
ered the flip-side of the dilemma faced by the officers in 
Garrity.62 In Gardner, a police officer was summoned before a 
53. 385 u.s. 493 (1967). 
54. Along with Garrity, the Court decided Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 
(1967). The Court held that a lawyer facing disciplinary proceedings could not be 
disciplined for failing to waive the privilege against self-incrimination. The Court 
noted that "[t]he threat of disbarment and the loss of professional standing, profes-
sional reputation, and of livelihood are powerful forms of compulsion to make a 
lawyer relinquish the privilege." 1d. at 516. 
55. The police officers were accused of falsification of court records, alteration 
of traffic tickets, and diversion of monies derived from bail and fines. New Jersey 
v. Naglee, 44 N.J. 209, 214, 207 A.2d 689, 691 (1965). 
56. Garrity, 385 U.S. at 494. New Jersey's forfeiture provision applied to any 
public officer or employee who refused "to testify upon matters relating to the 
office, position or employment in any criminal proceeding wherein he is a defen-
dant or is called as a witness on behalf of the prosecution." 1d. at 494 n.l (quot-
ing N.J. REV. STAT. § 2A:81-71.1 (Supp. 1965». 
57. See Garrity, 385 U.S. at 495. The trial court admitted the statements only 
after conducting a hearing to determine if the officers' statements were voluntary. 
1d. at 495 n.2. 
58. 1d. at 500. 
59. 1d. at 497. 
60. 1d. at 500. 
61. 392 U.S. 273 (1968). 
62. Gardner arose in the context of an employee seeking reinstatement after 
being terminated for refusing to waive the privilege against self-incrimination. 1d. 
15
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grand jury in connection with a criminal investigation. The 
officer was requested to sign a waiver of his Fifth Amendment 
privilege and was informed that job loss would be the conse-
quence of invoking the Fifth Amendment privilege.63 Declin-
ing to waive the privilege, the officer was discharged.64 Find-
ing that the officer was fired solely for refusing to relinquish 
the privilege against self-incrimination,65 Justice Fortas con-
cluded that "the mandate of the great privilege against self-
incrimination does not tolerate the attempt, regardless of its 
effectiveness, to coerce a waiver of the immunity it confers on 
penalty of loss of employment.'>66 
Although the Gardner Court held that a police officer 
could not be fired for asserting the Fifth Amendment privi-
lege,67 the Court indicated that the police officer could be fired 
at 274. 
63. [d. The New York Constitution continues to contain a provision that a 
public officer shall be removed from office for failure to sign a waiver of immunity 
to answer relevant questions before a grand jury. N.Y. Const. art I, § 6 (McKinney 
1982). 
64. [d. at 275. 
65. [d. at 278. 
66. Gardner, 392 U.S. at 279. The Court relied on Griffin v. California, 380 
U.S. 609 (1965), where it found that commenting on a defendant's silence at trial 
was a penalty on the exercise of the fIfth amendment privilege. Justice Douglas 
observed in Griffin: "For comment on the refusal to testify is a remnant of the 
'inquisitorial system of criminal justice: which the Fifth Amendment outlaws. It is 
a penalty imposed by courts for exercising a constitutional privilege. It cuts down 
on the privilege by making its assertion costly." [d. at 614 (citation and footnote 
omitted). 
The Fifth Amendment principle applied in Gardner is similar to the doctrine 
of unconstitutional conditions. The doctrine of unconstitutional conditions provides 
that the government may not grant a benefIt-which it has the right to withhold 
altogether-on the condition that the recipient of the beneflt surrender a constitu-
tional right. See Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARv. L. 
REV.. 1415 (1989). Since government employment is considered a privilege 
(Stephenson v. Binford, 287 U.S. 251 (1932); Bailey v. Richardson, 182 F.2d 46 
(D.C. Cir. 1950), affd (by an equally divided court) 341 U.S. 918 (1951)), Gardner 
could have been decided on unconstitutional condition principles. See Sherbert v. 
Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (denial of unemployment beneflts overturned because 
claimant required to choose between free exercise of religious beliefs and forfeiting 
benefIts). However, the Fifth Amendment prohibition against penalties applies in 
contexts where the unconstitutional condition doctrine would not apply. For exam-
ple, in Griffin the Court held that prosecutors could not comment on a criminal 
defendant's silence at trial because it would constitute an inappropriate penalty for 
exercise of the privilege. No privilege or benefIt was involved in Griffin and the 
doctrine of unconstitutional conditions could not have been invoked. 
67. A companion case decided the same day, Uniformed Sanitation Men Associ-
16
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for failing to answer questions relating to job performance so 
long as the answers were not used in a criminal proceeding. 68 
Thus, if the officer's responses were immunized from use in 
criminal proceedings, the officer's employer could compel an-
swers to questions about job performance and those answers 
could be used against the officer in an administrative or civil 
proceeding to terminate the officer's employment.69 
Following Gardner,70 lower federal courts and state courts 
have applied Garrity and Gardner on a number of occasions.71 
ation v. Commissioner, 392 U.S. 280 (1968), held that sanitation workers could not 
be terminated for failing to waive immunity. They would entitled to assert the 
privilege because their governmental employer was seeking "testimony from their 
own lips which, despite the constitutional prohibition, could be used to prosecute 
them criminally." Id. at 283. 
68. See Gardner, 392 U.S. at 278. 
69. The Fifth Amendment only prohibits compelled testimony in criminal pro-
ceedings. Accordingly, the compelled testimony can be used in civil or administra-
tive proceedings. Theoretically, the consequence of job loss may be more severe 
than sanctions flowing from criminal prosecution. However, the consequences of 
lying are usually greater in a criminal investigation than lying to a superior in an 
administrative investigation. 
70. The United States Supreme Court has extended its holding to public works 
contractors (Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973» and high level political office-
holders (Lefkowitz v. Cunningham, 431 U.S. 801 (1977». 
71. ALA: Benjamin v. City of Montgomery, 785 F.2d 959 (11th Cir.), cert. de-
nied, 479 U.S. 984 (1986) (police officers could not be terminated for invoking 
privilege; "at the time they first were called to the stand, appellants were not the 
subject of any disciplinary proceeding, and had not been directed to answer ques-
tions on pain of dismissal"); ARZ: William v. Pima County, 791 P.2d 1053 (Ct. 
Apps. Ariz. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 972 (1990) (police officer fired for refusing 
to answer questions; "grant of immunity by a proper judicial officer was not a pre-
requisite to his employer's right to require that he answer the employer's ques-
tions during the investigation"); CAL: Lybarger v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. 3d 
822, 710 P.2d 329, 221 Cal. Rptr. 529 (Cal. 1985) (police officer reinstated after 
being fired for failure to answer questions since he was not advised that state-
ment could not be used against him in criminal proceeding); Williams v. City of 
Los Angeles, 47 Cal. 3d 195, 763 P.2d 480, 252 Cal.Rptr. 817 (Cal. 1988) (officer 
was not entitled to reinstatement for failure to be properly advised that answers 
could not be used against him criminally since he answered questions); FLA: 
Farmer v. City of Fort Lauderdale, 427 So.2d 187 (Fla.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 816 
(1983) (although employee can be ordered to answer questions, employee could not 
be ordered to answer same questions by means of polygraph examination); GA: 
Erwin v. Price, 778 F.2d 668 (11th Cir. 1985) (police officer who was not required 
to waive privilege could be terminated for refusing to answer questions relating to 
job); MASS: Patch v. Mayor of Revere, 492 N.E.2d 77 (Mass. 1986) (a public em-
ployee may be compelled to answer questions relating to the job and the answer 
may not be used against the employee in a criminal proceeding); MISS: Knebel v. 
City of Biloxi, 453 So.2d 1037 (Miss. 1984) ("[s]ince Garrity holds that a state-
ment, given by a police officer about his official conduct under questioning from 
17
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Although Gardner was silent on the procedures necessary to 
compel job-related information from employees for non-crimi-
nal purposes, courts across the country have authorized local 
government agencies to grant use immunity without any statu-
tory authorization.72 Generally, use immunity is conferred 
pursuant to statute and requires application to a court by an 
authorized officer.73 However, courts have held that use im-
state authorities under threat that if he does not answer he will be fired, is inad-
missible into evidence in a criminal proceeding against the officer, it follows that a 
statement given under the promise that it will not be used against him in a crim-
inal proceeding is likewise inadmissible"); NJ: Banca v. Town of Phillipsburg, 436 
A.2d 944 (Sup. Ct. App. Div. N.J. 1981) (police officer may not be disciplined for 
failure to cooperate in investigation where he is the target and has not been of-
fered immunity); NY: Matt v. Larocca, 71 N.Y.2d 154, 524 N.Y.S.2d 180, 518 
N.E.2d 1172 (N.Y. 1987), cen. denied, 486 U.S. 1007 (1988) (public employees may 
be compelled to answer questions so long as answers cannot be used in criminal 
proceeding); OHIO: City of Warrensville Heights v. Jennings, 569 N.E.2d 489 (Ohio 
1991) (refusal of police dispatcher to take polygraph examination justified termina-
tion); Jones v. Franklin County Sheriff, 555 N.E.2d 940 (Ohio 1990) ("public em-
ployees can be required to answer potentially incriminating questions, so long as 
they are not asked to surrender their constitutional privilege against self-incrim-
ination"); PA: DiCiacco v. Civil Service Commission, 389 A.2d 703 (Com. Ct. Pa. 
1978) (employees can be ordered to answer questions if the employee is not told 
that "so as long as they have not indicated to the employee that assertion of his 
constitutional right to remain silent or a refusal to waive immunity from prosecu-
tion will constitute grounds for discharge"); TX: Firemen's & Policemen's Civil 
Service Commission v. Burnham, 715 S.W.2d 809 (Ct. Apps. Tex. 1986), cen. de-
nied, 488 U.S. 842 (1988) (officer could be terminated for failure to take polygraph 
examination concerning alleged rape); Gulden v. McCorkle, 680 F.2d 1070 (5th Cir. 
1982), cen. denied, 459 U.S. 1206 (1983) (police officers properly fired for refusing 
to answer question even though they were not advised that answers could not be 
used against them in criminal proceeding). 
72. See Erwin v. Price, 778 F.2d 668, 670 (11th Cir. 1985) (no statutory grant 
of use immunity required); Hester v. City of Milledgeville, 777 F.2d 1492, 1496 
(11th Cir. 1985) ("privilege against self-incrimination affords a form of use immu-
nity which, absent waiver, automatically attaches to compelled incriminating 
statements as a matter of law. Given this, any grant of use immunity to the 
plaintiffs would have been duplicative"); Knebel v. City of Biloxi, 453 So. 2d 1037, 
1040 (Miss. 1984) (immunity flows "not from the authority of the interrogator to 
make such a promise, but the very nature of the Fifth Amendment"); Jones v. 
Franklin County Sheriff, 555 N.E.2d 940, 945 (Ohio 1990) ("[t]he privilege against 
self-incrimination is preserved because a statement by investigators that nothing 
said at the hearing can be used at a subsequent criminal proceeding effectively 
immunizes that testimony from later use by a prosecutor"). 
73. See 12 U.S.C.A. § 1784(c) (West 1989) (National Credit Union Administra-
tion Board may apply to any court of the United States for order compelling per-
son to give testimony or produce documents); 15 U.S.C.A. § 57b-1(c)(12)(D)(iii) 
(West Supp. 1993) (Federal Trade Commission may apply to district court for 
order compelling testimony in certain civil investigative proceedings); 15 U.S.C.A. § 
1312(i)(7)(B) (West 1982) (Attorney General may apply to district court for order 
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munity flows directly from the Constitution when a public 
employee is ordered to answer questions by a superior under 
threat of termination.74 
In light of this history, it is not surprising that some police 
officers invoke the Fifth Amendment privilege following a 
shooting.75 Lawyers defending the police quite understandably 
compelling testimony in certain anti-trust civil investigations); 18 U.S.CA § 6003 
(West Supp. 1993) (United States Attorney may apply to district court for order 
compelling testimony before court or grand jury); 18 U.S.C.A. § 6004 (West 1985) 
(agencies, with the approval of Attorney General, may issue order compelling testi-
mony in proceeding before agency); 18 U.S.CA § 6005 (West 1985) (authorized 
congressional officer may apply to district court for order compelling testimony 
before congressional proceedings); 21 U.S.C.A § 884 (West 1981) (United States 
Attorney may apply to district court for order compelling testimony before court or 
grand jury in connection with violation of drug laws); 28 U.S.CA § 594(a)(7) 
(West Supp. 1993) (Independent Counsel may exercise power of Attorney General 
or United States Attorney and apply to district court for immunity under certain 
federal statutes). Cr. 28 U.S.CA § 1782 (West 1966) (district court cannot compel 
testimony in aid of proceeding before foreign or international tribunal "in violation 
of any legally applicable privilege"). 
In United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984), the Court declined the 
government's request for the court to provide immunity for the act of producing 
certain documents. It expressly "decline[d] to extend the jurisdiction of courts to 
include prospective grants of use immunity in the absence of the formal request 
that the statute requires." [d. at 616 (footnote omitted). 
74. See supra note 70 and cases cited therein. 
75. One officer, who invoked the privilege against self-incrimination in a crimi-
nal proceeding against a suspect he shot, explained his reasons for not testifying 
as follows: 
Q. Officer you said you felt it was not in your best inter-
est to testify. What did you mean by that? 
A. Meaning that their investigation isn't concluded and 
basically until that's concluded, it wouldn't be wise for me 
to make any statements about that night. It would be 
similar to us bringing the defendants up here and asking 
them to give details about the victims's house. 
Q. Let me ask you this: When you say it wouldn't be 
wise, do you think it would subject you to some kind of 
civil liability? 
A. It may. 
Q. And how is that? 
A. I don't know, anything's possible. Until the 
investigation's concluded, I don't know what may come of 
it. 
Q. Okay. And do you think it would subject you to some 
criminal liability if you testified in this case? 
A. The way things are nowadays in regards to scrutiny 
on police, who knows? 
Q. All right. So, you're basing your answer not on some-
19
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recommend this tactic. A newsletter of a law firm representing 
California law enforcement officers concluded that 
"[s]ubmission to an investigator's pressure for a voluntary 
statement, which can be used against the officer for any pur-
pose, is not to the officer's legal benefit." Instead, it advised: 
An officer who has just been involved in a shoot-
ing has no legal obligation to give an oral or 
written statement to any agency, unless re-
quired to do so by a superior officer. This is 
another way of saying that a law enforcement 
officer has Fifth Amendment rights not to give a 
voluntary statement just like any citizen does.76 
The number of officers refusing to provide voluntary state-
ments following on duty shootings is unknown, although one 
big metropolitan area sheriff has detected "an alarming in-
crease in the number of these officers who refuse to be inter-
thing specific in your case but just because anything's 
possible these days, is that a fair statement? 
A. In essence. 
Partial Transcript of Preliminary Examination, Nov. 23, 1992, at 15-16, People v. 
Robbins, Case No. SA 011711 (Mun. Ct. Santa Monica Jud. Dist.). 
76. Silver, Goldwasser & Shaeffer, Client Newsletter, Jan.-Mar. 1990, at 3. Fol-
lowing this newsletter, Los Angeles County Sheriff Sherman Block notified police 
chiefs that its homicide investigators were facing difficulty because of "confusion" 
caused by articles such as the Client Newsletter. Letter from Sherman Block to 
RUl1sell K Siverling, Police Chief of Alhambra, California, dated June 20, 1990, at 
2. In response, the firm noted: 
In a letter to police chiefs in Los Angeles County, Sheriff 
Sherman Block has criticized this office's policy of advis-
ing clients not to give a voluntary statement in a shoot-
ing investigation. 
. . . [W]hat is in the best interest of the officer involved 
in the shooting? Clearly, if there is an irrevocable, uncon-
ditional guarantee that the officer will not be prosecuted, 
then there is no fear that what he says might be used in 
a criminal prosecution. He could make a voluntary state-
ment . 
. . . We are concerned; we want you to make a state-
ment only if you are ordered to do so. Why? Because 
then your statement is a coerced one and it cannot be 
used against you in a criminal matter. 
Silver, Goldwasser, Shaeffer & Hadden, Client Newsletter, Fall 1991, at 1. Thus 
far, the regular practice of invoking the privilege is limited to officer involved 
shootings. However, the legal principles that permit the invocation of the privilege 
would apply to other situations. Conceivably, an officer could invoke the Fifth 
Amendment privilege and decline to prepare a report any time he or she has a 
physical encounter with a suspect. 
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viewed. "77 Like other individuals, the decision whether to 
speak. or remain silent is a personal one. Of course, some offi-
cers ignore the advice of their attorneys simply in belief that 
they have nothing to hide. On the other hand, invoking the 
privilege may not be looked upon favorably by the command 
structure in some departments, and officers may conclude that 
remaining silent will hinder career advancement. Other offi-
cers exercise their rights to remain silent out of fear of being 
second-guessed by prosecutors. 
III. THE CONSEQUENCES OF REMAINING SILENT 
Obviously, an officer's refusal to provide information can 
seriously impair the investigation of the shooting. This point 
was echoed by an independent police commission which found: 
When the LAPD does interview the involved 
officer, the officer's statement is usually "com-
pelled" under the statutory Police Officers' Bill 
of Rights. Legally, no "compelled" statement can 
be used in any criminal prosecution of that offi-
cer. Similarly, any information or discoveries 
obtained directly or indirectly from that state-
ment cannot be used against the compelled offi-
cer in a criminal proceeding. When these com-
pelled statements are taken at the beginning of 
the administrative investigation, any potential 
criminal prosecution will likely be very difficult 
to pursue.78 
77. Letter from Sherman Block to Russell K. Siverling, Police Chief of 
Alhambra, California, dated June 20, 1990, at 1. 
78. INDEPENDENT COMMISSION ON THE LoS ANGELES POLICE DEPARTMENT, 
REPORT OF THE INDEPENDENT COMMISSION OF THE Los ANGELES POLICE DEPART-
MENT 161-62 (1991). The report found the process of investigating officer-involved 
shootings was seriously flawed. Other problems included: 
[d. at 161. 
Officers at the scene are frequently gathered together and 
interviewed as a group, which many have appropriately 
criticized as an opportunity for witnesses to "get their 
stories straight." 
Officer statements are often not recorded until completion 
of a "pre-interview," which is attended only by LAPD 
officers. Only when the "pre-interview" is concluded is a 
recorded statement taken. 
Prosecution of persons upon whom immunity has been conferred can be 
21
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Equally problematic, a police officer invoking the privilege 
against self-incrimination following an on-duty shooting does 
not inspire public confidence about the propriety of the officer's 
conduct.79 The police are understandably regarded as the 
"thin blue line" protecting the public from criminal conduct. 
The public perception of the Fifth Amendment privilege does 
not coincide with the eloquent prose of Supreme Court deci-
sions. Although the Court has called the privilege "the hall-
mark of our democracy,"SO the average person on the street is 
likely to regard it "as safe harbor for those who break society's 
rules."sl 
The exercise of privilege is far more than a "public rela-
tions" problem. Both criminal and civil proceedings arising out 
of the police shootings can be adversely affected by an officer's 
claim to silence. In a criminal proceeding, the invocation of 
complicated. See United States v. North, 910 F.2d 843, modified, 920 F.2d 940 
(D.C. Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 941 (1991). Although a prosecutor is not 
barred from having access to immunized testimony (Gwillim v. City of San Jose, 
929 F.2d 465 (9th Cir. 1991); People v. Gwillim, 223 Cal. App. 3d 1254, 274 Cal. 
Rptr. 415 (Cal. Ct. App. 1990», prosecution may be foreclosed if a court cannot 
"escape the conclusion that the testimony could not be wholly obliterated from the 
prosecutor's mind in his preparation and trial of the case." United States v. 
McDaniel, 482 F.2d 305, 312 (8th Cir. 1973). As the United States Supreme Court 
observed, "[t]estimony obtained pursuant to a grant of statutory use immunity may 
be used neither directly nor derivatively." Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 
117 (1988). See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 461-62 (1972). 
In the Rodney King beating case, the convicted police officers asserted on 
appeal that certain witnesses had been exposed to their immunized statements. 
United States v. Koon, 34 F.3d 1416, 1431 (9th Cir. 1994). The court rejecting this 
argument, employing a test that requires a showing that "the substance of the 
exposed witness's testimony is based upon on a legitimate source that is indepen-
dent of the immunized testimony." Id. at 1432. The D.C. Circuit requires an addi-
tional showing that the exposed witness has not shaped or altered his or her 
testimony in any way as a result of the exposure. United States v. Poindexter, 951 
F.2d 369, 373 (D.C. Cir. 1991), cert. denied, _ U.S. _, 113 S. Ct. 656 (1992). 
79. Moreover, the refusal of police officers to explain their actions creates the 
appearance of unequal application of the law. If an individual kills someone and 
declines to provide any facts establishing justification, the police would virtually 
always make an arrest and take the person to jail. However, in the case of the 
officer who shoots someone, it is accepted practice that officer can assert the Fifth 
Amendment privilege without adverse consequences. 
80. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966) (Warren, C.J.) (quoting Unit-
ed States v. Grunewald, 233 F.2d 556, 582 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., dissenting». 
81. Stephen A. Saltzburg, The Required Records Doctrine: Its Lessons for the 
Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 6, 8 (1986). See Henry J. 
Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 
U. CIN. L. REV. 679 (1968). 
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privilege by an arresting police officer can result in the dis-
missal of the charges against the suspect.S2 In a civil proceed-
ing, adverse inferences can be drawn from the invocation of 
privilege.s3 Either way, the point remains: police invocation of 
privilege exacts high societal costs. 
Moreover, the public scrutiny essential to democratic con-
trol of police. agencies is diminished significantly in the ab-
sence of public documents describing the facts surrounding a 
shooting. Police reports prepared in the normal course of busi-
ness are generally public records at some stage.54 However, 
immunized statements taken during the course of administra-
tive investigations are usually considered internal or personnel 
documents unavailable for public inspection. S5 Hence, police 
82. The following exchange occurred in the preliminary hearing of a anned-rob-
bery suspect who was shot by a police officer: 
Q. Officer Suarez, how are you currently employed? 
A. By the City of Santa Monica as a police officer. 
Q. And were you so employed on the evening of Septem-
ber 23rd, 1992? 
A. Regarding the events of that night, based on the ad-
vice of my attorney and the Fifth Amendment of the 
Constitution of the United States, I'm going to decline to 
answer your questions. 
Partial Transcript of Preliminary Examination, Nov. 23, 1992, at 2, People v. Rob-
bins, Case No. SA 011711 (Mun. Ct. Santa Monica Jud. Dist.). 
83. See Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976) ("Fifth Amendment does not 
forbid adverse inferences against parties to civil actions when they refuse to testify 
in response to probative evidence offered against them"). See United States v. 
Taylor, 975 F.2d 402, 404 (7th Cir. 1992) ("[a] party who asserts the privilege 
against self-incrimination must bear the consequence of lack of evidence"); Robert 
Heidt, The Conjurer's Circle - The Fifth Amendment Privilege in Civil Cases, 91 
YALE L.J. 1062 (1982). 
In Shepherd v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 107, 550 P.2d 161, 130 Cal. Rptr. 
257 (1976), plaintiff in a wrongful death action arising from a police shooting 
sought an order precluding the defendant police officers from asserting the privi-
lege against self-incrimination at their depositions. Although the court concluded 
that there was no basis for overriding the privilege, it did note that "[i]f such 
assertions continue to be made at trial the question of 'appropriate juristic 
consequences' may well arise at that time." Id. at 117, 550 P.2d at 166, 130 Cal. 
Rptr. at 262. 
84. For example, the California Public Records Act, CAL. GoV'T. CODE §§ 6250-
6268 (West 1980 & Supp. 1994), requires that law enforcement agencies make 
available to the public certain infonnation concerning arrests "except to the extent 
that disclosure of a particular item of infonnation would endanger the safety of a 
person involved in an investigation or would endanger the successful completion of 
the investigation or related investigation." Id. § 6254(0 (West Supp. 1994). 
85. In Moffett v. City of Portland, 400 A.2d 340 (Me. 1979), the Maine Su-
23
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invocation of the privilege places certain constitutional princi-
ples in conflict with the democratic ideal of open government. 
The secrecy surrounding police shootings encourages a 
police agency to provide the press with the most favorable 
aspects of a shooting while concealing certain damaging facts. 
In some departments, it is not uncommon that shooting ac-
counts are given a favorable "spin" so they ''become reinter-
preted and refashioned to fit common public understandings of 
when and why police must shoot."86 
Finally, the practice of police officers conferring use immu-
nity on their colleagues in the same department can only fur-
ther the unwritten code of silence87 that is prevalent in many 
police agencies.88 The code of silence "mandates that no officer 
report another for misconduct, that supervisors not discipline 
officers for abuse, that wrongdoing be covered up, and that any 
investigation or legal action into police misconduct be deflected 
and discouraged.,,89 
Both the exercise of the privilege and the conferring of use 
immunity advance the objectives of the code of silence. The 
practice of police officers conferring immunity on other police 
officers "sanctions official lawlessness.,,9o Equally troubling is 
preme Judicial Court concluded that the State's Freedom of Access Act's exemption 
of "privileged" records applied to involuntary statements taken from police officers 
in administrative investigations. 1d. at 348. 
86. William B. Waegel, How Police Justify the Use of Deadly Force, 32 SOCIAL 
PROBLEMS 144, 153 (Dec. 1984). Not surprisingly, "[s]ecrecy and lack of procedural 
safeguards inevitably foster suspicion about the fairness of internal review." Na-
tional Commission on Causes and Prevention of Violence 385 (1969). 
87. The code of silence "is an unwritten rule and custom that police will not 
testify against a fellow officer and that police are expected to help in any cover-up 
of illegal action." David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence be Contained? 
1992 MARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 481 n.60 (1992). 
88. See Athelia Knight & Benjamin Weiser, D.C. Police Chief Praises Officer 
Who Broke Police Code of Silence, WASHINGTON POST, Dec. 16, 1983, at B1; Tim 
Weiner, Ex-Officer Who Broke Code of Silence Given Probation, PHlLA. INQUIRER, 
Feb. 13, 1985, at 1. 
89. David Rudovsky, Police Abuse: Can the Violence be Contained? 1992 MARv. 
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 465, 487 (1992). 
90. Jones v. Franklin County Sheriff, 555 N.E.2d 940 (Ohio 1990) (Douglas, J., 
dissenting). He stated: "The majority's result sanctions official lawless-
ness-lawlessness of the worst sort since the very people engaging in it are those 
whom we depend upon to enforce the law. If we permit this, who will watch the 
24
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the fact that "police investigators, investigating another police 
officer for suspected criminal activity, can in effect accord the 
suspected officer (a public employee) absolution for whatever 
criminal activity has occurred and has been admitted to inves-
tigators."91 The problem, of course, is the real potential of 
conflict of interest, favoritism, and unchecked discretionary 
justice. 
By itself, the troublesome reality of the exercise of the 
privilege presents no justification for police officers scuttling its 
use. Society has a general interest in uncovering information 
about criminal activities, yet the availability of the privilege 
curtails governmental information gathering. Indeed, since 
private citizens have full protection of the privilege following 
shootings, it is not unreasonable to suggest that police officers 
should be afforded similar safeguards. 
Immunity is the general price that society pays when it 
desires to compel information, reflecting "a rational accommo-
dation between the imperatives of the privilege and the legiti-
mate demands of government to compel citizens to testify.,,92 
Some of the problems caused by allowing police officers 
immunitycould be ameliorated through measures prohibiting 
immunity except in accordance with the statutory procedures 
providing for third party review.93 Although this reform would 
halt the questionable practice of police officers conferring im-
munity on their own, less information would be disclosed since 
neither timely voluntary nor compelled statements would be 
available.94 
Yet, immunity does not fully address the special account-
watchman?" Id. at 950. 
91. Id. 
92. Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 446 (1972). 
93. Other refonns might include making the immunized statements public 
records, thereby removing the cloak of secrecy that surrounds officer involved 
shootings. Although these responses merit consideration, they do not raise signif· 
icant constitutional issues and will not be the focus of the article. 
94. "Accurate and timely reporting of use of force incidents is the essential 
first step in the process of monitoring and controlling such responses." Interna· 
tional Association of Chiefs of Police National Law Enforcement Police Center, Use 
of Force 6 (1989). It is unlikely that prosecutors would seek to confer immunity 
until after other avenues of investigation had been exhausted. 
25
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ability required when police shoot. When a private citizen 
shoots, he or she is, by definition, not doing so on behalf of the 
state. By contrast, police officers "have at their disposal the 
capacity to act as judge, jury, and executioner."95 The wrong 
decision can needlessly take human life and expose the police 
officer's governmental employer to major financial liability.96 
Legitimate concerns may exist about continuing to confer such 
authority on an individual who declines to remain fully ac-
countable. Instead, personal concerns are elevated above the 
interests of the agency which conferred the power to use dead-
ly force. 
Public confidence in the life and death decisions of police 
agencies can best be advanced by requiring that police officers 
comply with post-shooting reporting procedures mandated by 
most police departments. The Atlanta Police Department's 
policy is illustrative of these requirements: 
a. An employee discharging a firearm shall, as 
soon as possible, take the necessary steps to 
report the discharge. 
b. An employee on or off duty shall notify 
his/her immediate superior officer as well as the 
officer in command of the zone facility or district 
in which the discharge took place. The employee 
shall submit all necessary reports without undue 
delay.97 
The rule further provides for far more detailed information 
concerning the use of deadly force, including: 
whether [the] firearm and ammunition were 
department issued or approved; the number of 
shots fired; the reason for the discharge; the 
distance between the employee and the person 
fired at when first shot was fired; who fired first 
shot; if employee was being fired on, how many 
95. G. Larry Mays & William A Taggart, Deadly Force as a Police Problem in 
Local Law Enforcement: Do Administrative Practices Make a Difference?, 5 POL 'y 
STUD. Rev. 309 (1985). 
96. In one month, the City of Santa Monica paid $1.3 million to settle one 
police shooting case and $1.1 million to settle another. Marilyn Martinez, SM to 
Pay $1.3 Million to Man's Kin, THE OUTLOOK, Aug. 19, 1993, at A1. 
97. Atlanta Police Department, Firearms Policy, Rule 6.10. 
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shots were fired at the employee. All the above 
information shall be included in the narrative 
and supplement portion of the incident report.98 
523 
It seems clear that such policies cannot be enforced when an 
officer invokes the privilege against self-incrimination. In what 
follows, this Article tests whether this assumption is correct. 
IV. SILENCING THE PRIVILEGE IN OFFICER-INVOLVED 
SHOOTINGS 
Few would deny that requiring police officers to provide 
reports of their official actions is essential to the proper admin-
istration of our criminal justice system. Likewise, sanctioning 
police officers for failing to honor reporting requirements for 
some illegitimate reason, or for no reason, would not raise 
bona fide Fifth Amendment concerns. However, when the offi-
cer declines to prepare the report by asserting the privilege 
against self-incrimination, public duty and individual rights 
clash. 
Garrity and Gardner form the foundation on which police 
officers claim they cannot be compelled to provide an account-
ing of an on-duty shooting without first receiving immunity. 
Still, this foundation all too readily turns to quicksand when 
one recognizes the limited scope of the Supreme Court's hold-
ings, and when one considers the rule and role of the required 
records doctrine. Consistent with these constitutional doc-
trines, at least one conclusion is clear: A police officer can be 
required to provide an unimmunized account of an on-duty 
shooting or face job loss. 
98. [d. A model policy on the use of force developed by the International Asso-
ciation of Chiefs of Police National Law Enforcement Policy Center provides that a 
written report should be prepared whenever a "firearm is discharged outside of the 
firing range." International Association of Chief of Police National Law En-
forcement Policy Center, Use of Force-Model Policy 1 (1989). 
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A. THE SCOPE OF GARRITY-GARDNER 
Garrity and Gardner were decided during the halcyon days 
of the Warren Court's revolution in criminal procedure. For 
better or worse, the doctrinal principles which provided their 
foundation have not been generally expanded. Instead, the 
Burger and Rehnquist Courts have significantly curtailed Fifth 
Amendment jurisprudence.99 
Similarly, public employees have not fared well in seeking 
safe harbor under other constitutional provisions. 1°O Given 
99. See, e.g., Arizona v. Fulminante, 111 S.Ct. 1246 (1991) (court held that 
hannless error rule applies to admission of coerced confession); Baltimore City 
Department of Social Services v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 (1990) (compelled pro-
duction of child not protected by Fifth Amendment); Braswell v. United States, 
487 U.S. 99 (1988) (sole shareholder could be compelled to produce records even 
though production might incriminate him); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157 
(1986) (volunteered statement by mentally ill person not the product of police coer-
cion notwithstanding the fact that statement may not have been "voluntary"); New 
York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649 (1984) (the court created a public safety exception 
to the giving of Miranda warnings); Selective Service System v. Minnesota Public 
Interest Research Group, 468 U.S. 841 (1984) (no 5th Amendment violation in 
conditioning student aid on draft registration); Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 
(1984) (admissions made by probationer to his probation officer without prior 
warning admissible even though probationer compelled to be honest with such 
officer); South Dakota v. Neville, 459 U.S. 553 (1983) (Court held that admission 
into evidence of refusal to take a blood-alcohol test following arrest for drunk 
driving did not violate Fifth Amendment); United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242 
(1980) (environmental reporting requirement did not violate Fifth Amendment); 
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976) (individual can be compelled to pro-
duce tax records prepared by accountant; act of production not sufficiently testimo-
nial); Baxter v. Palmigiano, 425 U.S. 308 (1976) (failure to testify for Fifth 
Amendment reasons can be commented on in civil proceeding); Garner v. United 
States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976) (defendant failed to assert Fifth Amendment and his 
response on tax form could be used against him); Kastigar v. United States, 406 
U.S. 441 (1972) (use immunity is constitutional; prosecutor bears burden of proving 
independent source of evidence in subsequent prosecution); California v. Byers, 402 
U.S. 424 (1971) (required records doctrine applicable to California requirement that 
drivers give identity following accident). See generally Leonard W. Levy, Against 
the Law: The Nixon Court and Criminal Justice 165-73, 181-87, 428 (1974). 
100. See National Treasury Employees Union v. Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656 (1989) 
(court applies balancing test to uphold warrantless drug testing of public employ-
ees without reasonable suspicion); O'Connor v. Ortega, 480 U.S. 709 (1987) (court 
applies balancing test to arrive at reasonableness standard for searches of public 
employee work areas); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) (questionnaire to 
other prosecutors not matter of public concern and not protected by First Amend-
ment); Snepp v. United States, 444 U.S. 507 (1980) (Court enforces agreement for 
confidentiality signed by former CIA employee). But see Rankin v. McPherson, 483 
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the decisional law in this area, an oracle might safely predict 
that the current Court might well jettison Garrity and Gardner 
if given the opportunity.101 Even the often liberal Justice 
John Paul Stevens appears prepared to cast off Garrity-
Gardner. In a dissenting opinion in Lefkowitz v. 
Cunningham,lo2 he concluded that the state's compelling in-
terest in avoiding an appearance of corruption by policymakers 
justified the loss of office for invoking the Fifth Amendment 
privilege.103 In light of the power and public trust accorded to 
police, Justice Stevens questioned whether he would have 
joined in the Garrity and Gardner decisions.104 
Yet, casting Garrity and Gardner far adrift is unnecessary. 
Instead, anchoring these cases to their factual setting of crim-
inal investigations and not everyday reporting requirements 
could provide an appropriate accommodation of the competing 
interests at stake. A survey of post Garrity decisions lends 
ample support to this narrowing construction. 
Police officers have unsuccessfully attempted to exclude 
reports prepared in the normal course of their duties from 
criminal trialS.105 Arguing that preparation of the reports 
U.S. 378 (1987) (employee's comment following attempt to assassinate the Presi-
dent held matter of public concern). 
101. The Garrity-Gardner cases have not escaped criticism. See, e.g., Henry J. 
Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional Change, 37 
U. CIN. L. REv. 679, 707 (1968). The United States Supreme Court, in a Fourth 
Amendment context, made a similar observation in finding that "[p]ublic 
employees' expectations of privacy in their offices, desks, and file cabinets, like 
similar expectations of employees in the private sector, may be reduced by virtue 
of actual office practices and procedures, or by legitimate regulation." O'Connor v. 
Ortega, 480 U.S. 709, 717 (1987). 
102. 431 U.S. 801 (1977). Cunningham struck down a statute that required a 
state political party officeholder to choose between holding office and self-incrimi-
nation. Under the New York Election Law, a political party officer could be re-
quired to testify about the conduct of his or her party office; the refusal to answer 
questions or waive immunity resulted in the forfeiture of office. [d. at 802-03. 
103. See id. at 813-14. He believed that the "claim of privilege can only erode 
the public's confidence in its government." ld. at 815. 
104. See id. at 814 n.12. 
105. See United States v. Indorato, 628 F.2d 711 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 1016, 101 S.Ct. 578, 66 L.Ed.2d 476 (1980) ("[w]e do not think that the 
subjective fears of defendant as to what might happen if he refused to answer his 
superior officers are sufficient to bring him within Garrity's cloak of protection); 
United States v. Ruiz, 579 F.2d 670 (1st Cir. 1978) (use of arrest report made by 
officer did not violate privilege since "fifth amendment proscribes compelled self-in-
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were mandated by department regulations,106 officers have 
claimed that the reports are "compelled" for Fifth Amendment 
purposes.107 This argument has been consistently 
rejected. l08 Likewise, the failure to write a report has been 
subject to disciplinary action when there was no evidence that 
the employee believed that writing the report would form the 
basis of criminal prosecution.l09 Such precedents reveal the 
crimination, not incriminating statements"); Commonwealth v. Harvey, 491 N.E.2d 
607 (Mass. 1986) (use of statement obtained in administrative investigation follow-
ing shooting); Commonwealth v. Ziegler, 470 A.2d 56 (Pa. 1983) (use of statement 
obtained in administrative investigation of citizen complaint). 
In Commonwealth v. Ziegler, 470 A.2d 56 (Pa. 1983), the court held that an 
officer's statements made during an administrative investigation of a shooting 
could be used against him in a criminal trial charging the officer with murder and 
involuntary manslaughter. 
In the instant case the questioning of appellee was man-
dated by departmental regulation, and represented stan-
dard procedure operative whenever a policeman discharges 
a firearm resulting in injury or death. The shooting oc-
curred while appellee was engaged in the performance of 
his duty, pursuing a suspected felon who offered resis-
tance, and there was nothing in the information then 
available to suggest that appellee's conduct was unlawful. 
It was not until five days later, after the post-mortem 
examination indicated that blows to the decedent's head 
may themselves have been a sufficient cause of death, 
that a complaint was issued for appellee's arrest. Thus, 
the post-shooting debriefing and questioning of appellee 
were conducted pursuant to routine administrative proce-
dure, and appellee was neither being held as a criminal 
suspect, nor had he reason to believe that such was the 
case. 
1d. at 560-61. 
A similar result was reached in Commonwealth v. Harvey, 491 N.E.2d 607 
(Mass. 1986). In a prosecution for larceny and civil rights violations, a police offi-
cer attempted to exclude his statements made in an administrative investigation 
following a citizen complaint of misconduct. Acknowledging that all police officers 
were required by department rules to answer questions relating to official duties, 
the court nevertheless concluded that "[tjhe fact that there existed the possibility 
of adverse consequences from the defendant's failure to cooperate does not demon-
strate that the defendant was 'compelled' to incriminate himself." 1d. at 611. 
106. See United States v. Indorato, 628 F.2d 711 (1st Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 
449 U.S. 1016, 101 S. Ct. 578 (1980); Commonwealth v. Harvey, 491 N.E.2d 607 
(Mass. 1986); Commonwealth v. Ziegler, 470 A.2d 56 (Pa. 1983). 
107. 1d. 
108. Id. This conclusion is consistent with the general requirement that the 
Fifth Amendment privilege is waived if not affirmatively asserted. See Gamer v. 
United States, 424 U.S. 648 (1976) (failure to assert privilege on income tax re-
turn waived privilege). 
109. See Devine v. Goodstein, 680 F.2d 243 (D.C. Cir. 1982). In Devine, an 
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appellate courts' willingness to curtail Garrity and Gardner's 
broad application in order to curb the potential for police 
abuse. 
In a number of cases, public employees have argued that 
disciplinary proceedings should be postponed when criminal 
investigations are pending against them.110 They assert that 
immigration inspector was suspended for failing to write a report responding to a 
complaint of inappropriate behavior. An arbitrator hearing the employee's griev-
ance reversed a suspension on the basis the privilege against self-incrimination 
barred punishment for failing to write the report. The court reversed, finding that 
the privilege against self-incrimination did not excuse the refusal to prepare the 
report since "the employee did not believe and could not have reasonably believed 
that his written report could be used in a criminal prosecution." 1d. at 247 (foot-
note omitted). The court noted that if the employee had a reasonable fear of crim-
inal prosecution, "[iln order to compel a written report, the government would 
have to have guaranteed that his answers could not be used against him in a 
criminal case." 1d. at 247 n.23. 
110. See Hoover v. Knight, 678 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1982) (failure to postpone 
administrative hearing pending resolution of related criminal charges, with officer 
refusing to testify, did not violate the privilege); Peiffer v. Lebanon School District, 
848 F.2d 44 (3d Cir. 1988) ("rather than being a case in which a public employee 
or contractor has been penalized for asserting his Fifth Amendment privileges, the 
situation here is simply that Peiffer did not rebut evidence constituting grounds 
for his dismissal"); Gniotek v. City of Philadelphia, 808 F.2d 241 (3d Cir. 1986), 
cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1050, 107 S.Ct. 2183, 95 L.Ed.2d 839 (1987) ("fact that ap-
pellants had to choose whether to talk or to remain silent offends neither the fifth 
nor the fourteenth amendment"); Diebold v. Civil Service Commission, 611 F.2d 
697 (8th Cir. 1979) (injunction to prevent administrative hearing pending outcome 
of criminal trial denied since no requirement that employee waive privilege); 
Buckner v. City of Highland Park, 901 F.2d 491 (1990) (Michigan), cert. denied, 
111 S.Ct. 137, 112 L.Ed.2d 104 (1990) (officer not entitled to grant of immunity so 
that he can respond to charges against him). See Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 
84, 90 S.Ct. 1893, 1897, 26 L.Ed.2d 446 (1970) ("That the defendant faces such a 
dilemma demanding a choice between complete silence and presenting a defense 
has never been thought an invasion of the privilege against compelled self-incrimi-
nation."). 
In United States v. White, 589 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir. 1979), the court stated: 
Keno contends that being forced to go to trial in a civil 
case while criminal charges arising out of the same con-
duct were pending forced him to choose between preserv-
ing his fifth amendment privilege and losing the civil suit. 
It appears to us, however, that Keno overstates his dilem-
ma. He was not forced to surrender his privilege against 
self-incrimination in order to prevent a judgment against 
him; although he may have been denied his most effective 
defense by remaining silent, there is no indication that 
invocation of the fifth amendment would have necessarily 
resulted in an adverse judgment. 
[d. at 1286 (footnote omitted). 
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an adequate defense cannot be mounted in the face of their 
right to assert the privilege against self-incrimination. 111 
These arguments have also been rejected,1l2 even though the 
fact-finder may draw adverse inferences from the public 
employee's failure to testify.l13 Here again, courts are tailor-
ing Garrity and Gardner to the realities of the criminal justice 
system. 
True to such trends, the New Jersey Supreme Court has 
confined Garrity and Gardner to their facts.114 Recognizing 
that they dealt with police officers subject to interrogation for 
prior misconduct and not with the failure to perform specific 
duties expected of all police officers, the unanimous court (per 
Chief Justice Weintraub) refused to exclude from evidence in a 
police officer's criminal trial a report an officer was required to 
prepare. 115 The New Jersey high court found nothing in 
Garrity or Gardner that excused a police detective's failure to 
file a required report or his later submission of a false re-
port. ll6 Duly mindful of existing case law, the New Jersey 
court reasonably opined that the Supreme Court would not 
extend Fifth Amendment doctrine to permit the assertion of 
the privilege as a bar to the preparation of a report required of 
a public officer. 117 
111. [d. 
112. [d. 
113. See Hoover v. Knight, 678 F.2d 578 (5th Cir. 1982) ("[w]e note that the 
hearing examiner would not be constitutionally forbidden from drawing adverse 
inferences from an invocation of the privilege against self-incrimination"). 
114. See State v. Falco, 60 N.J. 570, 292 A.2d. 13 (1972). The officer was 
charged with failure to report an incident and filing a false report. [d. at 574, 292 
A.2d. at 15. 
115. [d. at 584, 292 A.2d at 20. 
116. [d. 
117. See id. In an analogous situation, military courts have reached the oppo-
site conclusion. In United States v. Lee, 25 M.J. 457 (C.MA 1988), the Court of 
Military Appeals reversed the conviction by general court material of a serviceman 
for violating a regulation requiring production of documentation showing continued 
possession or lawful disposition of duty-free goods. The dissenting opinion would 
have found the required records doctrine applicable. [d. at 469-70. 
Article 31 of the UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, 10 U.S.C. § 831, 
prohibits compulsory self-incrimination and in a requirement predating Miranda 
prohibits interrogating any person suspected of a crime without a warning state-
ment. Capt. Fredric L. Lederer, Rights Warnings in the Armed Services, 72 MIL. L. 
REV. 1 (1976). The purpose of this requirement was stated by the Court of Mili-
tary Appeals: "Because of a subordinate military person's obligation to respond to 
the command of his superior, Congress enacted Article 31 to serve as a protection 
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Obviously, the Court in Garrity and Gardner could have 
framed the issue in terms of the officer's obligation to meet his 
or her job duties. In each case, the officers had statutory duties 
to cooperate with the criminal investigations. However, the 
duty in those cases was to cooperate in criminal investigations 
by submitting to interrogation. The investigations had many of 
the earmarks of the inquisitional questioning that the Fifth 
Amendment privilege was designed to prohibit. 118 Within that 
constitutional realm, Garrity and Gardner are firmly grounded 
in legal principle. 
Notably, the Supreme Court has never confronted the 
situation of an officer declining to prepare routine reports 
based upon assertion of the privilege. In such a situation, the 
officer is not required to choose between the privilege and loss 
of employment. Rather, the officer is required to choose be-
tween exercising the privilege and doing his or her job. Faith-
ful to the Garrity and Gardner decisions, a court could con-
clude that the loss of employment comes not from exercise of 
the privilege but from failing to discharge the duties of the 
job.u9 Absent such a salutary gloss on Garrity and Gardner, 
against the inherent tendency of that relationship, either directly or subtly, to 
induce an accused to respond to a question by the superior." United States v. 
Lewis, 12 M.J. 205, 206 (C.M.A. 1982). 
118. See LEONARD W. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 331 (1968). 
119. One might argue that a public employee, accepting employment in the face 
of requirements dictating waiver of the privilege, has consented to the waiver. 
However, it is questionable that an individual can affirmatively renounce the pro-
tection of the privilege from governmental questioning at a time when he or she 
has no occasion to invoke it. Compare United States v. Field, 193 F.2d 92 (2d Cir. 
1951), cert. dismissed, 342 U.S. 908 (1952) (bail sureties, by entering into surety 
contracts, had waived the Fifth Amendment privilege with respect to subsequent 
questioning when some of the defendants jumped bail), with Morgan v. Thomas, 
448 F.2d 1356, 1363 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 920 (1972) (surety 
agreement did not waive privilege because "it is difficult to understand how a 
person can be punished by the sanction of contempt for asserting the privilege in 
contravention to a prior contractual undertaking in no way contemplating circum-
stances which might make assertion of the privilege appropriate"). See Johnson v. 
Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) (test for waiver of constitutional right. But see Town 
of Newton v. Rumery, 480 U.S. 386 (1987) (upholding agreement waiving civil 
claims in exchange for dismissal of prosecution). 
The Supreme Court has implicitly rejected a contractual waiver in this very 
context. In Lefkowitz v. Turley, 414 U.S. 70 (1973), the Court held that contrac-
tors with the State of New York could not lose public works contracts by reason 
of the failure to waive the privilege in criminal investigations. Applying Garrity 
and Gardner, the Court held that contract termination, like job loss, violated the 
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it would be difficult or impossible to control many forms of 
potential or real police misconduct. Whatever else its purpose, 
the privilege was not intended to turn public servants into 
private bosses. True, locating the fault line that divides re-
quired duty from impermissible interrogation requires careful 
searching. However, no matter how difficult this task, it never-
theless represents a necessary distinction to ensure that public 
duty does not become subordinate to personal privilege. 
An appropriate demarcation may to be found in the insti-
tutional policies of an agency. Reports required of all employ-
ees in circumstances when no evidence of wrongdoing exists 
must be completed notwithstanding any personal claim of 
privilege. For example, many public officers are required to 
provide annual reports of their activities. An officer who fails 
to provide such a report based upon assertion of the privilege 
can be sanctioned not for asserting the privilege, but for failing 
to meet the requirements of the job. Plainly, such requirements 
are essential if responsible police rule is to be the norm. 
Likewise, an officer who declines to provide reports re-
quired of every officer following a shooting should not be able 
to seek refuge in Garrity and Gardner. Thus, the failure of an 
officer to follow department procedures and submit a report 
(such as that required by the Atlanta Police Departmene20), 
to participate in a routine de-briefing or to testify in court in 
any prosecution of the person shot could well be grounds for 
discharge even if the reason for the refusal is invocation of the 
privilege against self-incrimination. If an officer were to be-
come the target of an actual criminal investigation,121 howev-
Fifth Amendment. [d. at 84-85. The statutory scheme struck down in Lefkowitz 
included inserting contractual provisions in each public works contract providing 
for the waiver of the Fifth Amendment privilege. [d. at 71 n.1. The Court did not 
address whether these contractual provisions had any independent significance. See 
Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 130 (1988) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
("nothing in Fifth Amendment jurisprudence indicates that the acceptance of em-
ployment should be deemed a waiver of a specific protection that is as basic a 
part of our constitutional heritage as is the privilege against self-incrimination"). 
120. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. 
121. It must be conceded that it is not always easy to ascertain when the offi-
cer is a target of criminal investigation. Thus a bright-line rule might be estab-
lished that any criminal interrogation that is outside the routine reporting that all 
police officers are expected to participate in on a daily basis is subject to Gardner-
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er, Garrity-Gardner should permit exercise of the privilege to 
block interrogation in furtherance of such investigation with-
out fear of job loss.122 
From the officer's vantage point, he or she may well view 
this distinction as simply an attempt to end-run Garrity and 
Gardner. For some officers, the consequences of fulfilling one's 
duties may be self-incrimination. Viewed from this standpoint, 
it may appear that the officer is being required to choose be-
tween his or her job and the exercise of privilege. Yet courts in 
other contexts have held people to the duties they have freely 
assumed. Consider in this regard the logic of the Eleventh 
Circuit Court of Appeals in holding that assertion of privilege 
did not excuse compliance with the disclosure obligations of an 
insurance policy: 
Pervis seeks to recover proceeds based on the 
insurance contract to which he is a party; he 
must be held to the express terms of the agree-
ment. He is not compelled to incriminate him-
self. He is, however, bound by the provisions to 
which he stipulated when he signed the insur-
ance agreement and cannot expect State Farm 
to perform its obligations under the contract, by 
being subject to suit for payment of proceeds, 
without compliance on his part.123 
Likewise, police officers should not expect to have contin-
ued employment if they refuse to discharge their duties.124 
Concomitant with the officer's willingness to exercise the 
state's power of deadly force must be a willingness to account 
for this public exercise of power. Any assertion of a private 
Garrity. 
122. It should be recognized that limiting the reach of Garrity and Gardner 
would not be limited to police officers. Instead, it would have applicability to all 
public employees who fail to perform specific job duties. 
123. Pervis v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., 901 F.2d 944, 947 (11th Cir. 
1990). 
124. Police officers generally expect that their public agency employer will pay 
for any damages arising from an on-duty shooting. Under California law, a public 
employee is entitled to indemnification for liability arising out of the course of 
employment if the public employee provides "reasonable good-faith cooperation" 
with the defense of the action. CAL. Gov'T. CODE § 825 (West. Supp. 1994). In 
addition to or as an alternative to job loss, indemnification could be denied in 
situations in which the officer asserts the privilege. 
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privilege is simply inconsistent with the nature of the power 
that the officer voluntarily exercised. Indeed, it would be more 
than puzzling if the Constitution allowed a public official wide 
powers to take human life and thereafter accorded an equally 
broad immunity from public accountability. To borrow from 
Justice Jackson, the Constitution is not a suicide pact.125 
B. REQUIRED RECORDS DOCTRINE 
Independent of the Garrity-Gardner analysis, disclosure 
might be secured under another doctrine. Courts have carved 
an exception to general Fifth Amendment principles, an excep-
tion known as the "required records doctrine. "126 First recog-
nized in Shapiro v. United States,127 the required records doc-
trine provides "that the Fifth Amendment privilege may not be 
invoked to resist compliance with a regulatory regime con-
structed to effect the State's public purposes unrelated to the 
enforcement of its criminal laws. "128 The required records 
doctrine applies to a variety of self-reporting scenarios. l29 
In Shapiro, the United State Supreme Court considered a 
reporting scheme required by the Emergency Price Control 
Act.130 The Act required that businesses keep and disclose 
sales records "customarily kept" by the business. Rejecting the 
assertion of a Fifth Amendment privilege, the Court stated 
that the privilege "cannot be maintained in relation to 'records 
required by law to be kept in order that there may be suitable 
information of transactions which are the appropriate subjects 
125. Terminiello v. City of Chicago, 337 U.S. 1, 37 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissent-
ing). 
126. See Stephen A. Saltz burg, The Required Records Doctrine: Its Lessons for 
the Privilege Against Self Incrimination, 53 U. CHI. L. REV. 6 (1986). 
127. 335 U.S. 1 (1948). 
128. Baltimore City Department of Social Service v. Bouknight, 493 U.S. 549 
(1990). 
129. See The Supreme Court, 1989 Term-Leading Cases, 104 MARv. L. REv .. 
129, 178-79 (1990) ("Court has established an exception ... prohibiting invocation 
of the privilege when a defendant is required to disclose infonnation as part of a 
civil regulatory scheme"); Jeremy Temkin, "Hollow Ritual{sl": The Fifth Amendment 
and Self-Reporting, 34 UCLA L. REV. 467 (1986) ("there is a recognition that, in 
some situations, self-reporting may be relied upon for the production of infonna-
tion"). 
130. Shapiro, 335 U.S. at 3-4. 
36
Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 26, Iss. 3 [1996], Art. 3
http://digitalcommons.law.ggu.edu/ggulrev/vol26/iss3/3
1996] FIFTH AMENDMENT 533 
of governmental regulation and the enforcement of restrictions 
validly established."'131 Writing for the 5-4 majority, the Chief 
Justice emphasized: 
It may be assumed at the outset that there are 
limits which the Government cannot constitu-
tionally exceed in requiring the keeping of re-
cords which may be inspected by an administra-
tive agency and may be used in prosecuting 
statutory violations committed by the record-
keeper himself. But no serious misgivings that 
those bounds have been overstepped would ap-
pear to be evoked when there is a sufficient 
relation between the activity sought to be regu-
lated and the public concern so that the Govern-
ment can constitutionally regulate or forbid the 
basic activity concerned, and can constitutionally 
require the keeping of particular records .... 132 
In a sharp dissent, Justice Frankfurter criticized the majority 
for "hardly find[ing] a problem in disposing of an issue far-
reaching in its implications, involving as they do a drastic 
change in the relations between the individual and the Govern-
ment as hitherto conceived."133 While the full scope of 
Shapiro is somewhat ambiguous, certain matters have become 
more settled over time. 
Following Shapiro, the Court initially defined the scope of 
the required records doctrine in the context of laws designed to 
assist law enforcement efforts. Concluding that the doctrine 
does not apply where the regulatory scheme is principally 
aimed at criminal activity, the Court found unconstitutional 
regulatory schemes requiring disclosures by gamblers,l34 wag-
ers,135 communists ,136 illegal weapons possessors137 and 
transferrers of marijuana. 13B However, "[iJn all of these cases 
the disclosures condemned were only those extracted from a 
131. [d. at 33 (quoting Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 380 (1911». 
132. Shapiro, 335 U.S. at 32. 
133. [d. at 50. 
134. Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968). 
135. Grosso v. United States, 390 U.S. 62 (1968). 
136. Albertson v. Subversive Activities Control Board, 382 U.S. 70 (1965). 
137. Haynes v. United States, 390 U.S. 85 (1968). 
138. Leary v. United States, 395 U.S. 6 (1969). . 
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'highly selective group inherently suspect of criminal activities' 
and the privilege was applied only in 'an area permeated with 
criminal statutes' - not in 'an essentially noncriminal and 
regulatory area of inquiry.",139 
The required records doctrine was subsequently expanded 
in California v. Byers.l40 In Byers, the United States Supreme 
Court upheld provisions of the California Vehicle Code requir-
ing drivers to exchange certain information following a traffic 
accident. 141 Reversing the California Supreme Court's deci-
sion that immunity was required in order to compel such infor-
mation,142 the Court's plurality opinion upheld the reporting 
requirement. Although noting the tension between the privi-
lege and the information needs of the State, the Byers Court 
observed that any resolution required "balancing the public 
need on the one hand, and the individual claim to constitution-
al protections on the other."l43 Under such a regulatory 
scheme, the Court concluded that "the mere possibility of in-
crimination is insufficient to defeat the strong policies in favor 
of a disclosure called for by statutes like the one challenged 
here."l44 
The most recent Supreme Court application of the re-
quired records doctrine is found in Baltimore City Department 
of Social Services v. Bouknight. l45 In Bouknight, the mother 
of an abused child was given the choice of producing her child 
139. California v. Byers, 402 U.S. 424, 430 (1971). 
140. 402 U.S. 424 (1971). 
141. See 1967 CAL. STAT. 2009 (current version in CAL. VEH. CODE § 20002 
(West Supp. 1994». 
142. Byers v. Justice Court, 71 Cal. 2d 1039, 458 P.2d 465, 80 Cal. Rptr. 553 
(1969). Justice Peters, speaking for the California Supreme Court, stated the con-
flict created by such reporting statutes: 
[T]he present case exemplifies a conflict much discussed 
by commentators in recent years, the conflict between the 
individual's right to protection under the Fifth Amend-
ment privilege against self-incrimination and the 
government's substantial interest in having citizens report 
or otherwise divulge information to effectuate various 
regulatory measures designed to promote the public wel-
fare. 
Id. at 1049 (citations omitted). 
143. Byers, 402 U.S.at 427. 
144. Id. at 428. 
145. 493 U.S. 549 (1990). 
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or rem8.1mng incarcerated.l46 Although recognizing that the 
act of production may be both testimonial and incriminating, 
Justice O'Connor's majority opinion concluded that "Bouknight 
may not invoke the privilege to resist the production order 
because she has assumed custodial duties related to production 
and because production is required as part of a noncriminal 
regulatory scheme."147 Invoking the required records doctrine, 
the Court found that the obligation to permit inspection of the 
child is "part of a broadly directed, noncriminal regulatory 
regime governing children cared for pursuant to custodial or-
ders. ,,146 Noting the absence of the general exceptions to the 
Shapiro doctrine, the Court concluded that persons who care 
for children pursuant to custody orders are not a "selective 
group" or "inherently suspect of criminal activities"149 and 
that efforts to gain access to children are not aimed principally 
at criminal conduct,l50 but "for reasons related entirely to the 
child's well-being. ,,151 
Although Bouknight is believed to have "dramatically 
expanded" the required records doctrine,152 the Court did cre-
ate some doctrinal confusion by suggesting that the fruits of 
any disclosures might not be used in a criminal prosecu-
146. Id. at 553. 
147. Id. at 555-56. 
148. Id. at 559 (quoting Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361, 382 (1911» 
(citations omitted). 
149. Id. at 559. 
150. Id. at 560. 
151. Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 560. 
152. See The Supreme Court, 1989 Term - Leading Cases, 104 lIARv. L. REv .. 
129, 179 (1990). One commentator has observed: 
Thus, Bouknight can be viewed as the latest in a line of 
cases in which the Court gives states the greatest leeway 
when they act with dual purposes, no matter how close 
the relationship between the regulatory purpose and the 
criminal law objective. The danger to civil liberties cannot 
be underestimated. AB long as there is any component of 
a civil regulatory scheme ostensibly beyond the needs of 
law enforcement, government presumably will be free from 
constraints imposed by the criminal guarantees in the Bill 
of Rights. 
Irene Merker Rosenberg, Bouknight: Of Abused Children and the Parental Privilege 
Against Self·Incrimination, 76 IOWA L. REv. 535 (1991). Of course, "the ostensibly 
beyond the needs of law enforcement" qualification is the crux of the constitutional 
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tion. 153 If immunity were required in order to obtain informa-
tion from Ms. Bouknight, the Court took the wrong path in 
reaching its decision. Information obtained under the required 
records doctrine may be used in criminal proceedings. Indeed, 
in Byers the Court reversed the state court holding that im-
munity was required to compel disclosure of information by 
drivers involved in automobile accidents. 154 
Notwithstanding the Bouknight wrinkle, the required 
records doctrine is firmly established as part of today's Fifth 
Amendment jurisprudence. Following the Supreme Court's 
lead, lower courts have applied the required records doctrine in 
a variety of contexts.155 And if the Court· is troubled by such 
[d. 
153. See Bouknight, 493 U.S. at 561-62. The Court emphasized: 
We are not called upon to define the precise limitations 
that may exist upon the State's ability to use the testimo-
nial aspects of Bouknight's act of production in subse-
quent criminal proceedings." But we note that imposition 
of such limitations is not foreclosed. . . . In a broad range 
of contexts, the Fifth Amendment limits prosecutors' abili-
ty to use testimony that has been compelled. 
154. See Supra note 141 and accompanying text. 
155. See United States v. Nickens, 955 F.2d 112 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. 
Ct. 108 (1992) (affirming conviction for possession of controlled substance on air-
craft without reporting it for entry on cargo manifest); United States v. Lehman, 
887 F.2d 1328 (7th Cir. 1989) (affirming conviction for failure to comply with laws 
requiring livestock sales transaction records); United States v. Alkhafaji, 754 F.2d 
641 (6th Cir. 1985) (affirming conviction for failure to make disclosures required 
by the Gun Control Act of 1968); United States v. Dichne, 612 F.2d 632 (2d Cir. 
1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 928 (1980) (affirming conviction for failing to make 
certain reports required by the Bank Secrecy Act); United States v. Stirling, 571 
F.2d 708 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 824 (1978) (affirming conviction for fraud 
arising out of failure to make disclosures required by securities laws); In re Fair-
banks, 135 B.R. 717 (Bankr. D.N.H. 1991) ("disclosure is required as part of a 
noncriminal statutory scheme for administration of bankruptcy estates which re-
quires such disclosures for liquidation of the same and in no sense is aimed par-
ticularly at prospective criminal defendants"); cf. Commodity Futures Trading 
Comm'n v. Collins, 997 U.S. 1230 (7th Cir. 1993) (required records doctrine inap-
plicable to income tax return in taxpayer's possession since no law required tax-
payer to keep copy); United States v. Dean, 989 F.2d 1205 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (ap-
pointment calendar not subject to required requires doctrine because there was no 
duty to create such document); United States v. Wujkowski, 929 F.2d 981 (4th Cir. 
1991) (Bouknight not controlling because "the government does not contend that 
appellants were required to maintain the documents it seeks or to submit them 
for inspection as conditions of doing business with the government"). 
One district court has concluded that, even though the required records 
doctrine applied to the records themselves, the act of producing the records would 
constitute compelled, testimonial, and incriminating communication. In re Grand 
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applications, it certainly has not so indicated by way of its 
certiorari policy in this area. 
Today, the required records doctrine is most likely to arise 
in the context of an individual resisting compliance with gov-
ernment reporting laws. In circumstances in which documenta-
ry information has already been generated, other Fifth Amend-
ment principles usually allow the government to gain access to 
it. Thus, under the collective entity rule156 the books and re-
Jury Subpoena, 144 F.R.D. 357, 365-66 (D. Minn. 1992). Although the Supreme 
Court has applied this doctrine in other contexts (Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 
201 (1988); Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988); United States v. Doe, 
465 U.S. 605 (1984); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976», it has never 
been invoked to shield required records. In fact, in Bouknight the Court stated: 
The possibility that a production order will compel testi-
monial assertions that may prove incriminating does not, 
in all contexts, justify invoking the privilege to resist 
production. Even assuming that this limited testimonial 
assertion is sufficiently incriminating and "sufficiently 
testimonial for purposes of the privilege," Bouknight may 
not invoke the privilege to resist the production order 
because she has assumed custodial duties related to pro-
duction and because production is required as part of a 
noncriminal regulatory regime. 
Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. at 905. See In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 781 
F.2d 64 (6th Cir. 1986) (act of production doctrine inapplicable to required re-
cords). 
The California Supreme Court has applied the required records doctrine, 
fmding it consistent with the state constitutional privilege. In Craib v. Bulmash, 
49 Cal. 3d 475, 777 P.2d 1120, 261 Cal. Rptr. 686 (1989), the court considered 
whether the privilege barred the Division of Labor Standards Enforcement from 
compelling production of an employer's time and wage records. The court rejected 
the claim of privilege on the basis of the required records doctrine. Surveying the 
history of the required records doctrine, the court noted: "The lower federal courts 
continue to apply the 'required records doctrine' of Shapiro, while distinguishing 
Marchetti and its progeny. And, following the lead of Byers, several cases have 
allowed the mandatory disclosure of information which, on its face, could implicate 
the reporter in criminal conduct." 49 Cal. 3d at 489 (citations omitted). 
156. The collective entity rule was first recognized in Hale v. Henkel, 201 U.S. 
43 (1906), in which the Supreme Court held that a corporation has no privilege 
under the Fifth Amendment. Five years later, the Court held that a corporate 
officer had no personal privilege to resist production of corporate records. Wilson v. 
United States, 221 U.S. 361 (1911). The collective entity rule has been extended to 
both unincorporated associations (United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944» and 
partnerships (Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974». These decisions squarely 
hold that: 
The plain mandate of these decisions is that without 
regard to whether the subpoena is addressed to the corpo-
ration, or as here, to the individual in his capacity as a 
custodian, a corporate custodian. . . may not resist a 
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cords of corporations, partnerships, and unincorporated associ-
ations are not privileged because such entities have no Fifth 
Amendment privilege. Likewise, there is no privilege in docu-
ments which have been voluntarily created by an individu-
al. l57 In some circumstances, however, an individual may 
have a Fifth Amendment privilege not to be compelled to pro-
duce the document if the act of production might be incriminating.158 
subpoena for corporate records on Fifth Amendment 
grounds. 
Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99, 108-09 (1988) (citations omitted). 
157. See United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984). In Doe, the government 
sought production of business records of a sole proprietorship. The Court concluded 
that the records were not privileged: 
Respondent does not contend that he prepared the docu-
ments involuntarily or that the subpoena would force him 
to restate, repeat, or affirm the truth of their contents. 
The fact that the records are in respondent's possession is 
irrelevant to the determination of whether the creation of 
the records was compelled. 
[d. at 611-12 (footnote omitted). 
158. In Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976), the Court stated: 
The act of producing evidence in response to a subpoena 
nevertheless has communicative aspects of its own, wholly 
aside from the contents of the papers produced. Compli-
ance with the subpoena tacitly concedes the existence of 
the papers demanded and their possession or control by 
the taxpayer. It also would indicate the taxpayer's belief 
that the papers are those described in the subpoena. The 
elements of compulsion are clearly present, but the more 
difficult issues are whether the tacit averments of the 
taxpayer are both "testimonial" and "incriminating" for 
purposes of applying the Fifth Amendment. 
[d. at 410 (citation omitted). 
Although the Fisher Court found that the production of records of an ac-
countant by the taxpayer would not involve testimonial self-incrimination, the 
Court in United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984), held that the production of 
certain records by a sole proprietor would. [d. at 613-14. 
In Braswell v. United States, 487 U.S. 99 (1988), the Court refused to ex-
tend Fisher and Doe to the act of production by the sole shareholder of a corpora-
tion, finding the collective entity rule precluded any assertion of privilege. Howev-
er, the Court held that the act of production itself could not be used against the 
individual: 
Although a corporate custodian is not entitled to resist a 
subpoena on the ground that his act of production will be 
personally incriminating, we do think certain consequences 
flow from the fact that the custodian's act of production is 
one in his representative rather than personal capacity. 
Therefore, the Government concedes, as it must, that it 
may make no evidentiary use of the "individual act" 
against the individual. 
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Given its current scope, the required records doctrine can 
be used to require police officers to provide accounts of on-duty 
shootings. A reporting requirement (again similar to that of 
the Atlanta Police Department159) would likely prevail over 
the assertion of the Fifth Amendment privilege. The reporting 
requirement is part of a civil regulatory system governing 
public employees. The requirement is not aimed at a group 
inherently suspect of criminal activity, and is the type of re-
cord customarily expected of police officers. So long as the 
requirement operates in this way, it is not likely to be set 
aside on Fifth Amendment privilege grounds. 
Application of the required records doctrine has broader 
implications than simply limiting the scope of Garrity and 
Gardner. If Garrity and Gardner do not apply, the police officer 
still has the availability of the privilege, but its exercise may 
result in job loss. If, however, the required records doctrine can 
be invoked, the officer would face not only job loss, but also 
some form of compulsion to force revelation of the required 
information. 160 Compelling an individual to reveal informa-
tion that in some jurisdictions would constitute a capital crime 
highlights the dangers inherent in expansive application of the 
required records doctrine. 
For a variety of reasons, the required records doctrine is 
probably not the appropriate vehicle to secure unimmunized 
statements from police officers. From a practical standpoint, 
police agencies are unlikely to seek the judicial intervention 
that would ultimately be necessary to compel an officer to give 
a statement. Police administrators prefer remedies that they 
control; they do not want to rely upon outsiders to keep their 
house in order. Moreover, most police administrators would 
view job loss as an appropriate sanction for failure to provide a 
required report. 
Id. at 117-18. 
159. See supra notes 95-96 and accompanying text. 
160. Some statutory authorization would be required to compel a police officer 
to complete the report. Although police departments possess the authority to sus-
pend or termination police officers for violation of departmental policies, specific 
enforcement is generally not available. 
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The availability of the required records doctrine, however, 
may be important in securing a narrowing construction of 
Garrity and Gardner. If application of the required records 
doctrine would result in the an officer being obligated to pro-
vide the required report, Garrity and Gardner should not block 
a police agency from firing an officer who fails to do so. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The code of silence following on-duty shootings raises an 
important constitutional question concerning the conflict be-
tween public duty and individual rights. Some argue that the 
current practice of conferring use immunity strikes an appro-
priate balance between the government's need for information 
and the police officer's constitutional rights. In using deadly 
force, however, the police officer was not exercising an individ-
ual constitutional right but was instead acting as an instru-
mentality of the state. Accordingly, those officers who choose to 
exercise this immense power should be publicly accountable for 
the use of force. Such accountability is consistent with current 
law (constitutional, statutory, and administrative) and likewise 
accords with sound public policy principles. To deny the wis-
dom of such practices and principles would lead inevitably to a 
parade of horribles, one in which police misconduct of all kinds 
- from coverups to unlawful killings - would be tolerated and 
even encouraged. A code of silence would thus become synony-
mous with a code of tyranny. 
Justice Scalia once observed that "[n]o law enforcement 
agency is required by the First Amendment to permit one of its 
employees to 'ride with the cops and cheer for the robbers.,"161 
No law enforcement agency is required by the Fifth Amend-
ment to permit one of its employees to shoot like a cop and 
remain silent like a murderer. Admittedly, as phrased, this 
assertion seems brazen. Still, it is defensible if only because it 
calls much needed attention to a basic lesson of life and law: 
To remain oblivious to the obvious is both unsound and unsafe. 
161. Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 394 (1987) (quoting App. 94). 
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